MIDDLE EAST MASULINITY STUDIES
DISCOURSES OF “MEN IN CRISIS,”
INDUSTRIES OF GENDER IN REVOLUTION

PAUL AMAR

ABSTRACT

This article examines how everyday theories of masculinity and vernacular discourses of “masculinities in crisis” play crucial roles in misrecognizing, racializing, moralistically-depoliticizing, and class-displacing emergent social forces in the Middle East. Public discourses and hegemonic theories of male trouble render illegible the social realities of twenty-first-century multipolar geopolitics and the changing shapes of racialism, humanitarianism, nationalism, security governance, and social movement. In order to help generate new kinds of critical research on Middle East masculinities, this article creates a larger map of discourses and methods, drawing upon studies of coloniality and gender in and from the global South. This mapping puts masculinity studies into dialogue with critiques of liberalism and security governance and with work in postcolonial queer theory, public health studies, and feminist international relations theory.

On the morning of Dec. 17, when other vendors say Ms. Hamdy [a 45-year old policewoman in Tunis] tried to confiscate Mr. Bouazizi’s fruit, and then slapped him in the face for trying to yank back his apples, he became the hero—now the martyred hero—and she became the villain in a remarkable swirl of events in which Tunisians have risen up to topple a 23-year dictatorship and march on, demanding radical change in their government. (Kareem Fahim, “Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia,” New York Times, January 21, 2011)
Observers have commented for decades now on the global “feminization of poverty.” It may now be important to turn our attention to the “masculization of inequality” [and] the gender of humiliation…. From Mohammed Atta to Mohamed Bouazizi, something is going on when even foreign policy and counterterrorism security wonks sense a masculinity problem. (M. Christian Green, “Inequality, masculinity & modernity,” Contending Modernities blog, March 7, 2011)

Advocating for the eradication of masculinity is not reactionary, nor is it self-hatred…. Masculinity is a dangerous game that can’t be won. (Jehanzeb Dar, “Eradicate Masculinity,” Muslim Reverie blog, October 2, 2010)

The old order of masculinity in Egypt is slowly but surely crumbling, and a new order—one that demands equality and rejects hierarchy—is emergent. While I can’t say for sure whether or not sexist norms, especially sexual harassment, will fade… I think it is fairly undeniable that a new masculine imagination is coming out at a grassroots level. If that isn’t revolutionary, then I don’t know what is. (Annie Rebehak Gardner, “The Role of Masculinity in the Egyptian Uprising,” Canonball blog, February 10, 2011)

Many observers initially responded to the emergence of popular uprisings that spread from Tunisia to Egypt to Libya and beyond in 2011 with shocked incomprehension. To fill this perceived intelligence gap, public analysts, bloggers, and media commentators drew, again and again, upon the bottomless well of vernacular Middle East masculinity theories to resolve their questions: What caused masses of Arab youth to rise up against their governments? Perhaps the young men among them were sexually frustrated by the paucity of jobs that prevented them from fulfilling their manhood by marrying and becoming heads of household (Krajeski 2011)? What caused the violence of police and thugs against protesters, particularly women, in Tahrir Square? Perhaps it was the predatory sexuality of the “Arab street” whose undisciplined male aggression revealed that the people of the region were not really ready to govern themselves in civil democratic fashion (Bayat 2011)? What caused the “chaos” of “tribal protests” in Yemen? Perhaps it was the surplus of daggers and guns in a culture where “having weapons is a sign
What caused the armed forces in Tunisia and Egypt to align themselves with protesters and against dictators? Perhaps it was the paternalism of the generals who offered protection in exchange for acceptance of their patriarchal values. What caused the more brutal response of the regime in Libya as compared to those of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt? Perhaps it was because Muammar el Qaddafi had manned up? Perhaps he learned that the flaccid tactics of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak would lead to failure, so he stood firm and summoned the supposedly ruthless masculinity of black African mercenaries to crush the rebels (Rawls 2011).

The New York Times has been particularly consistent in deploying its version of masculinity studies to explain violence in and from the Middle East: In the video documentary, Portrait of a Terrorist: Mohamed Atta, it traces the motivations of the lead September 11th hijacker back to his awkwardness with girls and wounded male pride (Coombes and O’Connor 2002). In the epic investigative essay, “Where boys grow up to be Jihadis,” the New York Times describes how frustrated young men in Morocco, having failed as soccer players and drug dealers and having failed to use John Travolta haircuts to attract girls, then turned to bombing the Madrid metro and joining the insurgency in Iraq (Elliott 2007). Thus it was only natural for the Times, when revolution began in Tunisia in 2011, to trace the revolt’s origins back to the frustrated masculinities of the two men they deemed to be the instigators of this new kind of uprising: Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook, who invented his social network supposedly because his girlfriend dumped him, and Mohamed Bouazizi, the self-immolated fruit-vendor and martyr invoked in the first epigraph above, whose pride was gravely shamed when the policewoman would not let him “yank back his apples” (Fahim 2011).

These public-discourse versions of masculinity studies and everyday etiologies of racialized Middle Eastern maleness operate as some of the primary public tools for analyzing political change and social conflict in the region. The same sets of vernacular theories also prop up intelligence services and terrorology industries whose wildly inaccurate studies of Islamism and of politics in general in the Middle East are often built upon pseudo-anthropological or psychological-behavioralist accounts of atavistic, misogynist, and hypersexual masculinities. These institutionalized methods of masculinity studies have shaped geopoli-
tics and generated support for war, occupation, and repression in the region for decades. In this light, when one embarks upon an attempt to reframe Middle East masculinity studies, it must be done with full self-consciousness. Although this field is seen by some as a cutting-edge, progressive corner of feminist and queer studies, its vernacular avatar is a primary node of domination.

In a line of research I am developing, in which this article represents a first phase, I examine how everyday theories of masculinity and vernacular discourses of “masculinity in crisis” play crucial roles in misrecognizing, racializing, moralistically-depoliticizing, and class-displacing emergent social forces. Vernacular, public discourses and theories of masculinity help to render illegible the social realities of twenty-first-century multipolar geopolitics and the origins of insurgent racial, humanitarian, and securitized nationalisms and globalisms. I am searching for gender/sexuality/coloniality-conscious ways to reframe and render legible emergent formations and patterns that are rising up to challenge, reappropriate, or humanize security-state and police-state governance forms. These governance forms, which I group under the term “human security states” (Amar 2011b), emerged in part through the retrenchment and market-making structures referred to as neoliberalism. However, these governance forms now seem to be abandoning economistic rationalization and market liberalization frames for legitimization. They instead justify coercive state action through the humanization or humanitarianization of security governance, without reference to market rationales. They do so by invoking the rescue or cultivation of securitized human subjects, particularly those of sexualized gender and racialized class, as informed by both colonial legacies and new imperatives of transnational humanitarian discourses and parastatal security industries. Faced with this colonial return and the intensification of security-state governance forms, I argue that critical scholarly approaches need not resort to totalizing metaphors of “bare life” (Agamben 1998), emergency sovereignty, and imperial domination, as some contemporary European critical theory has done. By adopting a more conjunctural mix of post-disciplinary empiricism and alternative bodies of political and cultural theory, fields such as gender and sexuality studies, women’s studies, queer studies, race and neocolonialism studies, and Middle Eastern studies can examine critically subjects of
masculinity and their hypervisibility in these contexts. By hypervisible subjects I mean fetishized figures that preoccupy public discourse and representations but are not actually recognizable or legible as social formations and cannot speak on their own terms as autonomous subjects rather than as problems to solve. They cannot be recognizable in their own socio-economic context of production. Moralized, criminalized, racialized, colonized masculinities in the Middle East are some of the most popular subjects of modern geopolitical hypervisibility, twinned with their fetishized Others or victims—the supposedly suppressed traditionalized veiled woman and the supposedly Occidentally-identified modernized gay man.

In order to open up the already vibrant interdisciplinary field of research on Middle East masculinities, it is important to continue to move away from culturalist or behavioralist notions that define the methodologies of most state, non-governmental, and intelligence projects vis-à-vis Arab masculinities. Scholars can adopt a more materialist approach that focuses on industries and institutions that are producing the particular subjects of masculinity who are seen as animating these crises. These masculinity industries can be provisionally grouped into three categories:

1. Security masculinities: Policing, security, and moral-governance institutions and private security consulting firms produce knowledge that defines Arab masculinities and subjects of surveillance including the sex predator, the thug/gang member, the trafficker, and the meta-subject of the emergency/security governance: the terrorist.

2. Paternafare masculinities: As analyzed in the work of Anna Marie Smith (2007) on U.S. post-welfare governance or by Kate Bedford (2009) on the sex and gender disciplines of World Bank governmentalties, one can identify the emergence, in the context of the dismantling of welfare states in the Middle East and in the West, of private-public partnerships and the mix of repressive, therapeutic, and humanitarian-rescue operations. These kinds of processes, particularly as configured by militarized governance in emergent and semiperipheral countries, comprise parts of the set of contradictory governance logics that I call “human security states” (Amar 2011b). These gendered governance forms have replaced public sector jobs and family assistance with coercive marriage promotion campaigns that undertake surveillance of the sexual-
ity and fertility of unmarried men and of divorced mothers or, in the Middle East, of women who have had children in the context of morally and legally ambiguous temporary marriage. These institutions block and morally undermine any attempt by men or women to make social claims upon public resources. Instead such claims are criminalized as the state reorients around the monitoring of failed fathers and the restoration of what are seen as responsible patriarchal behaviors, feeding the notion that the region is hungry for authoritarian father-figures—be they military officers or religious leaders.

(3) Workerist masculinities: These insurgent forms of masculinities, including increasingly important and visible “female masculinities” (Halberstam 1998), are emerging from newly powerful labor confederations in the region, particularly in Egypt. Women factory workers who are described positively as mu’alima and jada’a (courageous, macho, masterful) and the young men who often follow them were at the forefront of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, leading the April 6 Movement, participating in Citizen Security Brigades that fought back against police and thugs, and reconstituting the Muslim Brotherhood and its gender and class agendas from the inside.

Here I will not elaborate a political sociology or institutional ethnography of these new masculinity industries and governance subjects. Instead, in this article I offer a critical exploration of research agendas and theories that can be useful in both exposing the hegemonic form of discourses of masculinity in crisis and illuminating the operations of masculinity industries such as the three identified above. I aim to expand the imagination of Middle East masculinity studies by creating a larger map of discourses that constitute the objects of a more critical, expanded field, which I provisionally divide into five sub-trends:

1) political philosophy: focusing particularly on problems of liberalism and ethno-nationalism;

2) coloniality and dependency schools: coming from Latin American and Caribbean scholars in Marxist and neocolonial studies traditions;

3) sensory empiricism: emerging from queer public health studies, activist anti-identitarian theory, and Foucauldian social history;

4) biological determinists and new literalists: building upon the return of genetic essentialism and evolutionary biological criminology
to articulate claims for tolerance of “minoritarian” masculinities;

5) critical regional and diaspora studies: specializing in critical interdisciplinary research on masculinities, queer subjectivities, and racialized gender in and from emergent global-South powers and post-colonial cultures; and

6) feminist international relations studies: focusing on masculinity and subjects of gender, class, and deviance generated by international financial and security institutions.

CONTEXT: THE “HUMAN SECURITY STATE”

In the state and public sphere of many twenty-first-century Middle Eastern countries (particularly in Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, and Jordan) neoliberal market-making has been subsumed by particular kinds of humanism, blending a depoliticized form of Islamic moralism with contradictory forms of humanized police and military security-state enforcements. These humanized forms of control are designed to appear blind to or cleansed of class distinctions and ethnic difference, but are increasingly obsessed with sexualized gender and a privatized and securitized ethics of the self. In the Middle East, a new mode of governance, increasingly referred to as human security, works to blend hybrid forms of Islamic feminism and secular social hygiene projects. The current moment of securitized governance in the Middle East focuses on gender trouble and on disruptive public sexualities that have come to displace and repress the political visibility of how this governance form radically reinscribes class (into hygiene subjects), religiosity (into moralistic dilemmas), and race/ethnicity (into vectors of trafficking and perversion). In this context, a “human security state” (Amar 2011b) is one that blends increasing police and repressive power with highly gendered logics of militarized rescue, coercive social reform, and humanitarian intervention, which are seen simultaneously to justify and humanize the increasing intervention and surveillance power of the security model.

These new late-neoliberal or post-neoliberal gender industries have been generated in Middle East states as responses to the dysfunctions of market deregulation and privatization politics and the contradictions of neoconservative doctrine. They have also been generated in the wake of the de-radicalization of Islamism through its incorporation into
middle-class moral reform movements and consumer cultures (Bayat 2007). Projects for gendered public morality, sexual regulation, family constitution, and suppression of trafficking in bodies have become central axes of governance, executed through an unaccountable jumble of non-governmental organizations, government projects, municipal police, planning and public health initiatives, and international human rights and humanitarian organizations (Amar 2011b). At the center of this new humanized security model, the governance formations identified above (security masculinities, paternafare/therapeutic masculinities, and workerist masculinities) build upon both colonial legacies and new discourses of security politics and the governance logics promoted by the mix of nationalism and neoconservative moralism.

In this context, can we assert that the discursive field representing Middle East masculinities is in crisis? This seems apparent, given the impasse in the debates between two camps. On one hand, there are those, often termed liberals or universalists, who focus on the heteronormative masculinity of the modern state while highlighting the resistance of women and queer subjects (Jama 2008, Whitaker 2006). On the other hand, there are the anti-imperialists, who emphasize the forms of domination and exclusion that some forms of queer liberalism and feminist universalism reproduce (Massad 2008). The division of labor between the two methodological camps tends to reproduce the split between those who see masculinity as the crisis-node of sexuality, which, in turn, becomes a vector of imposition, and those who frame the sphere as a realm of performative autonomy. This binary often reanimates the dualism of West versus East, implying that a realm of sexuality is a driving force of modernity, with some focusing on its power to incite and dominate and others underlining sexuality as a realm of eroticized autonomy and emancipation. However, there are other, more productive approaches that identify sexuality as a realm of mechanisms by which domination and autonomy are simultaneously linked while appearing essentially distinct. This happens through the governance practices that generate fear and desire and that animate or degrade bodies and spaces.

To transcend binaristic approaches, the more nuanced approaches have detailed the cultural and social formation of masculinities within national(ist) projects and class formations, popular religiosities and insurgent cultures and inserted them into the narrative of secularizing,
Western influences and impositions that have incited the formation of men’s identities in the region (Aghacy 2009, Ghoussoub and Sinclair-Web 2000, Ouzgane 2006). Another set of historiographic and cultural-political theory projects has focused on excavating and revaluing the autonomy of unique cultures (Murray and Roscoe 1997, Najmabadi 2005), juridical and medical traditions (Afary 2009, Ze’evi 2006), modes of representation (Babayan and Najmabadi 2008), projects of policing class and regulating space (El Shakry 2007, Fahmy 1997, 2004, Jacob 2011), and forms of affective and artistic expression (El-Rouayheb 2005, Lagrange 2000) that animate masculinity and gender in the region. This set of exciting new works explores the imperial archives (Ottoman and Persian as well as European) but also puts colonialism in its place as not the only vector or legacy informing desire, embodiment, and normativity in the Middle East.

Also, a set of projects mixing political-economy, institutional ethnography, and sociology has illuminated contemporary processes of globalization and forms of disciplinary and biopolitical governance as they are taken up by subjects of gender and sexuality in the region. These works focus on issues such as the waning and waxing influence of Gulf Arab cultures and investment and new labor patterns (Elsheshtawi 2006, 2009, Ghannam 2002), the gendering of urban spaces and tourism and consumer cultures (Abaza 2011, Abdalla 2006, De Koning 2009, Rieker 2010, Singerman and Amar 2006, Wynn 2007), public health and family planning discourses (Ali 2002, 2003, Inhorn forthcoming, Inhorn 2007), the changing economics and legal framings of marriage (Hasso 2010, Kholoussy 2010, Singerman 2005), television, novel, and film subjectivities (Abu Lughod 2004, Gana 2010, Hayes 2000, Mehrez 2010, Shafik 2007), gendered ethical-moral subjectivities (Mahmood 2005), popular social movements (Bayat and Herrera 2010, Harders 2002), and police or security regimes in the Middle East (Amar 2011a, 2011b, Khalili and Schwedler 2010). This group has contextualized and rendered more complex the methodologies for apprehending postcolonialism, nationalism, state forms, and gender cultures, and how they overlap in the production of new kinds of femininity and, to use Marcia C. Inhorn’s (forthcoming) term, “emergent masculinities.”

Beyond the specialized field of Middle East and Islamic studies, the interdisciplinary field of masculinity studies is often considered to be
relatively new, emerging to apply the lessons of feminist and queer studies to the analysis of maleness and heterosexuality. But masculinity studies can better be understood when recognized as a legacy of the oldest of social science fields. Eighteenth-century police sciences and nineteenth-century criminology provided the foundation for the modern-secular state, and early twentieth-century social psychology and sexology created the self-disciplining consumer/wage earner subject. While generic *manliness* or virility and the public or general figure of civilized mankind was attributed, by law and practice, to property-owning middle- or upper-class white men, *masculinity* was often interpellated as a figure of sexual excess or developmental atavism—marked by class/criminality or race/coloniality (Bederman 1995, Carver 1996). Masculinity studies, until today, remains haunted by the needs to problematize deviant, working-class, youth, colonized and racialized masculinities and to provide pragmatic interventions and public policy fixes.

To date, masculinity studies remains focused on charting the social norms that characterize subgroups of men, with particular interest in norms that foster violence, including domestic violence, gang membership, homophobia, terrorism, and militarism, among others. In a certain light, this agenda can seem emancipatory, shifting attention from the deviancy of homosexuals or the marginality of women and turning it toward the constructed nature of masculinized, heteronormative identities, heterosexual forms of family and social life, and modes of violence embedded in so-called “normal” male behavior (Kimmel 1994, Kimmel, Hearn, and Connell 2003). Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) scholars and feminists have drawn on the literature of masculinity studies in order to shed light critically on how the norms of heterosexuality and/or homosociality are generated in relationship to ethnic cultures, territorial identities, and social histories. But the field’s dominant branch still leans toward broad behavioralist generalizations and therapeutic similes: masculinity as homophobia, masculinity as misogyny, masculinity as myth. Elaborating psychological or biomedical generalizations, and, delinked from theories of specific social and historical power locations, critical approaches to masculinity can easily become incorporated within liberal, colonial, or disciplinary state projects. For example, accounts of masculine norms and socialization processes that generate domestic violence can be utilized to increase
repressive interventions by the state in racialized and immigrant communities in ways that increase gendered violence and economic marginality. Studies of male youth self-organization and militarization can feed the extension of gang injunction legislation, the mainstreaming of counter insurgency policing policies, and the re-segregation and re-racialization of social space. Studies of men’s homophobia, misogyny, and harassment behavior can be misused to create gender and class segregation in urban spaces and workplaces, leading to projects of class and ethnic cleansing that never resolve root questions of gender and sexual justice.

In the late 1990s, given recognition of these problems of complicity and the grounding of masculinity studies in the governance-commitments of criminology and social psychology, masculinity studies—as a critical field delimited on its own terms within queer and feminist research—seemed to disappear. Either feminist studies or women’s studies was reasserted as an identity for those doing work that left behind the framework of norms and deviance and examined the masculinized prerogatives of the state, (post)colonialism, and capitalism. The earlier work of Wendy Brown (1997), V. Spike Peterson (1994, 1997), and Cynthia Enloe (1980, 1993), which predated the emergence of the vogue for masculinity, studies returned to the forefront, as these studies emphasize the links between the production of masculinities and the prerogatives of the juridical and military state. Their methods made it more difficult to project the violence of masculinity onto the cultures, identities, and mentalities of racialized and working-class communities.

In the remainder of this article I sketch out trends in scholarship to serve as resources for transcending the impasse created by hegemonic popular-discourse forms of Middle East masculinity studies and the understandable, although methodologically specific, return to women’s studies. Hoping to build upon recent advances in and around academic Middle East masculinity studies, the next section will go well beyond them in order to review relevant trends (and to revive some defunct frameworks) in political philosophy, public health studies, Latin American and non-Middle East regional studies, and feminist international relations theory. The aim is to underline how other research frameworks can contribute to the contemporary contentious, productive debates on masculinity, around and beyond the liberalism-sexuality nexus.
One of the landmark examinations of liberalism in Middle East studies (predating the work on this topic by gender studies and post-colonial studies) is Albert Hourani’s (1962) *Arab Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939*. Hourani traces the birth of Middle Eastern liberalism to Napoleon’s invasion and occupation of Egypt in 1798. Napoleon’s arrival begins a story of adoptions from and rivalries with the West. Hourani developed the figure of the Arab liberal as an enlightened modernizer and borrower from the West, aiming to liberate nations from colonialism and economic domination. But by rendering liberalism and collaboration as equivalent, Hourani’s classic account unintentionally reaffirmed the notion that anti-Western political formations that did not identify explicitly with modernization (that is, with knowledge and technology transfer), such as Islamism, were not informing and informed by the technologies, discourses, and subjectivities of liberalism and modernism.

Distinct from but not unrelated to works that focus on Middle East liberals-as-collaborators are those that describe Islamic liberals as tolerators. These studies of quasi-liberal diversity/toleration regimes shifted discussions of liberal-secularism away from the question of anti-religiosity and emphasized, instead, its utility as a set of anti-monopoly conflict-resolution mechanisms. This discussion has had an oblique impact on the study of Islamic political history. For example, Charles Taylor (2009) draws on Ashis Nandy (2002, 85) and Amartya Sen (2005) to identify the rule of Mughal Emperor Akbar (in South Asia) as “secular” because he worked to find “fair and harmonious modes of coexistence among religious communities.” He continues: “This takes account of the fact that formulae for living together have evolved in many different religious traditions, and are not the monopoly of those whose outlook has been formed by the modern, western dyad, in which the secular lays claims to exclusive reality” (Taylor 2009, xxi). This work turns inside-out the equivalence of “tolerance” with Western imperialism’s Othering of an essentially intolerant Islam, as analyzed by Wendy Brown (2008) in *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire*.

Similarly, Mark Baer (2007) and Aron Rodrigue (1996) focus on how the Ottoman Empire promoted conviviality among its many reli-
gious and ethnic minority communities in ways that can be re-read as a more successful substitute for liberal-secularism than were the more European-linked notions of individualism and nationalism. These kinds of works, often uncited by scholars of masculinity or gender in the Middle East, have started to make it possible to build a new infrastructure of Middle East masculinity studies that is not committed to naturalizing and sustaining the binaries of East/West, sensuality/rationalism, and Islam/secularism. In the newer frameworks, spaces of liberal-secularism are not limited to traditions that self-identify as such, but are rendered legible only through the critical activity of the researcher or the imagination of the political mobilizer. This formulation resembles Lisa Duggan’s queer-theory view. In her landmark article, “Queering the State,” Duggan (1994) insists that we move beyond the politics of mobilizing the state to protect and privilege a particular kind of gay/lesbian individual (i.e. the married, disciplined individual, proudly serving in the military, and recognized and visible as a consumer) and, instead, argues that we should focus on “disestablish[ing]” the state’s preference for and monopolization of any one kind of family or sexual subjectivity. This plan follows the model that sees the project of liberal-secularism as working to disestablish any one religion or rule-making logic or normative system. This is not at all the same as working against religion from the metaphysical position of the free individual, a practice that tends to pigeonhole religion, by definition, as a set of illiberal, uncritical practices, private and thus not having to be rationalized via public debate or verification.

Saba Mahmood has offered some of the most articulate and provocative interventions into the debates around gender studies and liberalism studies in the Middle East. In Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Mahmood (2005) details the habitus of women practitioners in the Egyptian piety movement. These women strive to retrain their desires, values, and self-presentations in order to highlight painful emotions, explicitly disempower themselves, and generate a self-subject identified with submission rather than individual fulfillment or rights. As read by Amina Jamal (2008, 123), “Mahmood rejects the kind of agency that lies in the significatory and therefore disruptive potential of performativity... based in the feminist and secular idea of embodiment.” Mahmood’s (2006, 328) work insists that the essential project of
liberalism “lies not so much in tolerating difference and diversity but in remaking certain kinds of religious subjectivities (even if this requires the use of violence) so as to render them compliant with liberal political rule.” In this formulation, the mystification of the violence of subjectification (and its inscription as a process of liberation and autonomy) is the essence of liberalism. So, practices of piety that forefront and embrace the pain and limits and violence and exclusions of fashioning the self, not in order to resist but to submit to that violence, are not liberal. But if they are not resistant or political in ways that liberalism would recognize, does that mean that they are not resistant or political at all?

Mahmood (2006) addresses how women’s practices are descended linearly from Islamist and Aristotelean traditions focusing on honor, virtue, and submission. But one may also ask how they are implicated in contemporary local and global transformations and shaped by recent transforms of in mechanism of gendered political violence and interventionist governmentalities in Egypt. The study demonstrates that women in the piety movement are not liberal-individualists and that they reject any overt claim to a political role. Yet their movement is portrayed as a challenge to the corruption and venality of elite consumer cultures and the authoritarian state that supports them, and thus can also be seen as part of recent trends in political Islam toward a contradictory mix of consumerism and moralism (Bayat 2007). Recently Islamism has turned away from projects of revolutionary transformation and toward a focus on moral governance of women and youth. This movement generates anger and what can be described as a masculinity panic among Egyptian husbands, indicating that it embarrasses and highlights the hypocrisy of men who remain in the leadership of Islamist and moralizing movements. So although it is not explicitly political or individualist, the piety movement does have political effects, but these effects are more in the vein of disestablishing the moral monopoly of masculinities and the legitimacy of the state’s version of secularism. The movement does this by exposing and performing the violence of privatizing and moralizing subjectification.

COLONIALITY AND DEPENDENCY SCHOOLS

There is a critical genealogy of scholarship that has often dropped out
of the intellectual citation and authorization practices of gender studies. This includes scholars in the neo-colonial studies and dependency schools, many of whom did not engage directly with masculinity studies. However, this scholarship can be still useful when brought to bear on these questions. This group adopted approaches that prioritized the dismantling of Eurocentrism and utilized comparative methods that integrated concepts of race, coloniality, and world-systems. These comparativist approaches were committed to understanding the production of spaces, subjectivities, and political-economic structures in the post-colonial, non-Western world. But they did not share Michel Foucault’s (1978a, 1978b) interest in consolidating Europe-centered liberal-modernity into one model. Starting in the 1950s, other critiques of the origins of colonial-capitalist modernity, instead of going inside the European prison, went out to seek origins for and theories of global modernity in the colonies. As remarked by Timothy Mitchell (2000, 2), Samir Amin (1957), an Egyptian economist and historian, originated the critical study of world systems theory and global dependency/underdevelopment studies with the frameworks articulated in his doctoral dissertation entitled “On the Origins of Underdevelopment: Capitalist Accumulation on a World Scale,” which was widely circulated and translated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism, Amin (1976), who has spent much of his career in Dakar, Senegal, focuses on the crucial role of the identities of bourgeoisies in the colonized periphery as crucial to the perpetuation of inequality in the world system. In a landmark book that drew upon Amin, but went in a radically distinct direction, Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) found the origins of modernity—what we call Western capitalism and identify as its essential obsession with individualized risk and discipline—in the origins of commercial insurance mechanisms, cosmopolitan urban market spaces, and trade networks in Cairo and Baghdad in the fourteenth century.

In the 1960s through the 1980s, the dependency school in South America, taking up the ideas of Samir Amin, generated a model of colonial-modernity based on the forced de-development and de-industrialization of what was known as the Third World. In this conception, the colonized world was reduced to a supplier of raw goods and required to be a consumer of Northern products. Key to the dependentista argu-
ment was a de-centering of the agency of the colonizer, whose interests and tactics were more than clear. Instead, dependentistas argued that the core subject of colonial-modernity was the liberalized and liberalizing subject of the southern comprador capitalists, nationalists, and southern consumers. The complicity of subjects, social groups, and spaces identified with these intermediary formations created the power of modernity. The argument was this: If the consciousness and desires of these comprador groups could be brought into alignment with the interests of local cultures, workers, and national capital, then revolution could be unleashed and the power of Eurocentrism, and perhaps even capitalism, could be broken. Thus spaces of liberalization in the consumer and intermediary comprador spheres of the global South, not the disciplinary penitentiaries of France, became the key figuration of colonial-modernity. However, there is a problem with this radical body of theory: In addressing questions of sexuality and masculinity, it often uses simplistic patriarchal nationalist analogies to identify subjects of queerness and disreputable femininity as collaborators or dupes of imperialism, linking imperialist comprador and consumer identities to queer forms of desire and to the realms of non-reproductive sensuality, sexuality in general, and queer masculinity in particular.

Scholars in the delinking or dependency schools predated Foucault and so pursued a distinct path of global inquiry and comparativist critique. Foucault’s critique of psychologism (1978b) and criminology (1978a) did not seem to leave the home-territory of the liberal-Western Republic, and it reproduced Lockean (or at least Weberian) myths of Europe as an autonomous, ingenious innovator and developer of productive, superior cultures, subjects and properties, or, in this case, technologies of discipline. Foucault did not hold much appeal for the dependentistas, as his focus on the power of sexuality and the discipline of the self as the core mechanism of modernization may have seemed too close to the self-image of the comprador or consumer bourgeoisie in the global South. Their obsessions with sexuality and crime marked their complicity with imperialism and their incapacity to identify with national capital and colonized peoples in their homelands.

In Orientalism, Edward Said (1979), although often linked with Foucault, was deeply indebted to the dependentistas and Frantz Fanon and to their emphasis on the productivity and strategic uniqueness
of subjectivities in the colonial periphery. There is some ambivalence in Said’s classic work: Does the power of colonialism originate in the intellect and texts of Western Orientalists, or does it materialize in the mechanisms whereby Orientalism is taken up by indigenous elites and adherents and then remakes bodies and spaces within the Middle East? Importantly, Said saw the whole of the Orient, rather than the subjectivity of the Western incarcerated body (as per the Foucauldian scheme), as the anchor of the sexualizing power of colonial modernity. But the collective agency of the Orient was never foreclosed by the knowledge-power formations that produced what we could call its hypervisible representations, nor was sexuality reduced to an analogue of or vehicle for colonial dependency. Along the lines of scholars such as Fanon, Said often used language that indicated that Orientalism was a mask behind which or through which more revolutionary and oppositional subjects could be constituted and through which the eroticized gaze of the colonizer could be subverted and recoded. This was exemplified in his description of the youth leaders of the intifada or the iconic female masculinity and radical nationalist embodiment assumed by Egyptian belly dancer Tahia Carioca. In both ways, Said’s work laid the foundation for a new generation of anti-Eurocentric scholarship.

In the more recent work of Joseph Massad, we see a great appreciation of Said. But Massad’s (2002) approach somewhat resembles a culturalist dependentista methodology, like that of Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart’s How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic (1971). In Massad’s work, the focus is on Arab intellectual compradors and consumers of Orientalism rather than on Western producers and colonizers. In this view, sexuality and desire are analyzed in their capacity as mechanisms of collaboration with coloniality and as training in dependency. Can a critique of Eurocentrism be mounted that avoids the cleansing of colonialism and global-South subjects from Foucauldian approaches to sexuality, without adopting the stance of dependentistas who see sexuality and liberalization as dupes of imperial power?

For good reason, approaches focusing on coloniality and dependency that are committed to eradicating Eurocentric biases in scholarship have a long history of sex phobia and lack of interest in feminist scholarship. They tend to see modernity’s obsession with sexuality as a form of
possessive individualism expressed through consumerism or compradorism. Thus sexuality becomes at least as much a colonial suspect category as does race. And masculinity in this optic becomes a stand-in for either macho proletarian consciousness (often explicitly homophobic) or for the subaltern racialized, class-marked, false-consciousness sexuality of the lumpen. But new trends in scholarship have generated alternative models for critical, anti-colonial scholarship that do take globalizing sexuality and liberalism seriously by focusing on public subjectivities and lived spaces, generating grounded case studies and engaging three-dimensional, located intersections of power. Through specificity and comparison, these works move beyond the universalization of Western liberalism and psychologism. Foucault’s (1978b) use of the prison and asylum could not achieve this, since his spaces have come to serve as universalizing metaphors for shifts in power typologies, rather than as genuine sites for ethnography and productive spaces of contestation.

SENSORY EMPIRICISM IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND HISTORY

One of the avenues proposed for exiting from the impasse in masculinity studies is a shift of methodologies away from questions of identity and political discourse toward forms of inarticulate sociality, non-politicized intimacies, and non-verbal practices. These new methodological avenues circumvent spoken or represented identities as they are articulated in social movements, governance, or the public sphere. These theorists have argued that highlighting naming practices that are less identitarian (e.g. developing terminologies that flag less identitarian categories such as “men who have sex with men,” “the downlow,” or, of course, “queer”) is not enough. Instead these theorists aim to develop empirical, ethnographic methods that get beyond the interview and the speech act, and so properly appreciate the nonverbal, non-psychological quality of erotic and social sexuality. Inspired by the pioneering ethnographic work of Charles Hirschkind (2006, 21), who develops methodologies for rendering “subterranean forms of… sensory aptitudes and practices inhabiting contemporary cultural-historical formations,” I provisionally label these masculinity-studies method “sensory empiricism” to highlight certain commonalities in these scholars who do empirical fieldwork and often also work in activist or therapeutic interventions and who develop
new legibilities for sensory and erotic social performances and forms of contact rather than maintain the frame of measuring and qualifying ethno-cultural or gender identities.

In his recent work, Richard Parker (2009) proposes that empirical social scientific and public health start anew with an open apprehension of practices of public erotic sociality, which has consistently been marginalized by political ethnography and socio-historical archival work on sex talk and sex texts. Parker argues that methodologies that are open to the full sensorium of practices (not merely of the sex act itself, but of eroticized sociality and spatial circulation) may offer new ways to explore and catalogue the world of the visual, the tactile, and the olfactory and thus break out of the semiotic limitations of spoken and written utterances and their anchoring in the landscape of hegemonized political subjectivities. Parker’s work, which has often focused on public sexuality and sexual health in Brazil, faced criticism in the past—that his notion of a non-identitarian world of sensory interaction, where gay/straight and black/white identities blur, may reflect the persistence of a Tropicalist worldview. Tropicalism, a colonial discourse that overlaps with Orientalism in many ways, sees the sexuality of “tropical peoples” (usually meaning Latin Americans and Caribbeans of color) as more polymorphous and less disciplined than those of the North. Tropical sensuality stands as either a threat to modern disciplinary subjectivity or as the much desired supplement that adds color, vitality, and flexibility to Western modernity. Parker is aware of these critiques, but he, along with many Brazilian scholars of racialized sexuality and public eroticism, such as Peter Fry (1986, 2000), Osmundo Pinho (2011), Rosana Heringer and Pinho (2011), and Laura Moutinho (2004), insist that sensorial Tropicalist methods can transcend their colonial origins. Furthermore, they emphasize that empirical fieldwork on tactile, olfactory, physical, spatially specific forms of contact that are not pre-segregated into social, racial, or identitarian subjects may reveal alternative social formations of power as well as alterity that public utterances, public records, and social movements may be missing or obscuring. This agenda has been articulated by Bradley Epps (2005, 145 – 8) as an “ethic of promiscuity,” drawing upon, in particular, the epistemological innovation embedded in the work of marginalized Brazilian sex ethnographer and urban sociologist, Néstor Perlongher. These Brazilianists that I group together as sensory
Empiricists can be seen as parallel to the vernacular methodology of Latino queer performers who, as described in the work of José Muñoz (1999), have developed processes of “disidentification” through which Tropicalism and Orientalism are explicitly mined and spectacularized in ways that recover and revalue underground forms of racial, class, and gendered collectivity and that destabilize notions of embodiment, pleasure, and masculinity.

This trend toward sensory empiricism reflects the methodological innovations of sexuality scholars who resist the tendency to use psychoanalytic methods that analyze queer worlds either in relation to universal structures of psychic abjection or as a projection of individual complexes and neuroses. As David M. Halperin (2001) insists, the great contribution of queer sexuality studies to the social sciences and humanities is its elaboration of non-psychoanalytic (and, by extension, non-liberal-individualistic) approaches to understanding the formation of the subject and the experience of subjectivity immersed in spaces of violence and formations of power. For Halperin, the subjectivity of sexuality can be read not in a psychological orientation but rather in the experience of possession by demons that are generated by a community, the sharing of sensory affect, the collective experience of music or violence, and even immersive humiliation. This non-psychological exploration of subjectivity is open to perceiving the embrace of non-identitarian embodiment not as a form of utopian transcendence, but as a solemn embracing of mortality and its limits and contrarily the marginalization of individual productivity and risk regimes.

Middle East sexuality specialists are not overtly in dialogue with these Brazilianist thinkers, nor are they necessarily committed to the embrace of anti-psychological, neo-Tropicalist, or anarchic methodologies. Nevertheless, certain social historians of the Middle East have been moving in parallel paths, early signs of which can be seen in Vincent Crapanzano’s (1985) ethnographic work on masculinity and popular spirituality cultures.

The discipline of social history, the methods of which seem even more dependent on texts than the methods of those who do contemporary social-science or public health fieldwork, has made surprising strides. Historians working on Egypt have generated remarkably close readings of public archives of court documents and popular culture arti-
facts that implement a sensory empiricist agenda. The newer scholarship of Khaled Fahmy (2004) and the groundbreaking book by Wilson Jacob (2011) can be read as “sensory empiricist” history, analyzing the odor of the open sewer, the athleticism of the gym, the disease of the prostitute, the corpse examined by the forensic investigator, and the landscape of Cairo street gangs. These works generate epistemologies on their own terms and can reveal unexpected forms of agency and resistance, or “…the cultivation of feelings and bodies proper to a modern national subject [that] was no less an important site of self-knowing than the acquisition of the new sciences of man and nature (Jacob 2011, 13).” These methods capture forms of monstrosity, ingenuity, and cruelty that then become articulated into the historical record on their own terms. These discoveries at the periphery of the textually captured sensorium do not represent a pre-history of liberal modernity, gender identity, or sexual rights. But they can be of interest to those who are organizing today for sexual justice or social rights in contemporary Egypt and who feel constrained by the limitations of identitarian or liberal frameworks.

BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISTS AND NEW LITERALISTS

One of the most visible shifts in the public policy wing of sexuality studies is the increasing embrace of biological determinism. Biologists’ assertions that sexual orientation is genetic or biologically determined has now become an argument for rights and toleration, rather than a “skull measuring” criminological argument for racialization and pathologization. Researchers interested in this biologistic turn within liberal sexual-rights mobilization argue that claims for rights, protection, and toleration can be attached to research and mobilizations that insist that homosexuality is a natural component of biodiversity. This triggers calls for a paternalistic framework, along the lines of diversity management schemes for race and ethnicity that eradicate the social, political, and cultural origin or destiny of minority formations and dissolve them into sets of protected traits or properties of individuals. According to this new bio-determinist doctrine of toleration, genetically differentiated human sexual minorities, if tolerated (for example, allowed to join the military or get married), will be fully assimilated into the paternalistic, “natural” order and not threaten or remake it. Bio-determinist funda-
mentalism, blended with paternalistic tolerance discourse, has enabled campaigns for sexual rights and diversity to be championed by the most unlikely of supporters, including Christian and Islamist moralists and neoconservatives. These literalists and determinists can easily transition from Darwinian secular theories of biological determinism to religious notions of divine ordination. According to these interpretations, if God or nature created homosexuals or diverse forms of sexual identity, then these creations must be tolerated, but as privatized marks of diversity along with race and ethnicity, not as alternatives to the ordained status of the family or of the binary gender order or national framework of ethnic and racial hierarchies.

In Europe and North America, Christian fundamentalists, liberal sexuality-rights activists, and deterministic genetic scientists have become unlikely bedfellows. But parallel coalitions have been coming together in the Middle East, too. Hanadi Al-Samman (2008), in a masterful review of representations of male and female homosexuals in modern Arabic literature, analyzes how homosexual characters have become regular, central figures. But, as he argues, these are not queer subjects; rather they have become standard rhetorical devices that symbolize male powerlessness, inferiority to the West, and alienation from politics. Al-Samman writes that “gay encounters [are represented as] a symptom of the social deterioration caused by political and economic oppression of the Arab citizen” (270). Just as dependentistas represented homosexuals as symbols of the comprador, a collaborator with sensualized consumer identities, these nationalist texts reduce the sexuality dimensions of repressive power to tales of how straight men are threatened by the perverting influence of imperialism. Al-Samman reveals that the new, unique, and emancipatory trend in Arabic literature is toward depictions of homosexuals as innately, biologically different, and that this difference is not a symbol or symptom of domination or imperialism but a resource for the Arab nation. This undoes the work that Arab psychologists did in the 1940s “to dislodge the vernacular notion of homosexuality as innate so that they could turn it into something curable” (El Shakry, forthcoming). Al-Samman draws upon an example from Hoda Barakat’s (1995) *The Stone of Laughter*, in which an androgynous and effeminate boy is gradually ground down by the abuse of the secret police, militarized society, and the prevalent obsession with salvaging and reconstituting
natural, soldierly, honorable Arab masculinity. Al-Samman (2008) argues that this novel, along with Arab society as a whole, is gradually understanding that homosexuals, or sexual minorities in general, can be resources for enriching and nurturing a more tolerant society and for cultivating forms of masculinity that wield strengths that are conceived not just in military terms. But what kinds of patriarchy are being reinscribed by this politics of recognizing and protecting the bio-natural specialness of creative, effeminate boys, and of researching cultural and social trends toward biological essentialism and so-called tolerant theological literalism?

CRITICAL REGIONAL AND DIASPORA STUDIES

Emerging from a productive intersection of ethnic studies, postcolonial studies, immigration/diaspora studies, and critical area studies, new forms of regional studies have offered generative perspectives on masculinities that can be of broad interest to gender specialists working in or on the Middle East. As analyzed by Mara Viveros Vigoya (2002), work among Latin American scholars and artists theorizing masculinity within that region tends to be split. On one hand, some humanists and novelists explore masculinity, particularly machismo and caudillismo (authoritarian manliness), as constructed by sexualized colonial violence and radical hierarchies imposed on indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant slaves. On the other hand, some social-scientists are more likely to ignore race and coloniality and focus instead on urban and transnational processes of modernization, capitalism, and consequent labor patterns as shaping masculinities. Work on masculinities in Latin America overcomes this divide, and this outlook is currently being articulated by feminists working on race and indigenous issues and among queer scholars sensitive to class and coloniality (Amar 2009, Green 1999, Pinho 2011).

Scholarship on Southeast Asian modernities and South Asian queer and queer-diaspora communities has generated novel apprehensions of masculinities and sexualities that are of particular interest to Middle East masculinity studies. These works are valuable because Islam, nationalism, and colonialism are also explored and theorized there, as are urban-transnational class and gender economies. This occurs through

Exciting new work on racialized masculinities and queer immigrant formations facing Islamophobia is also of interest to scholars of Middle East masculinities, not because Muslim gender subjectivities are the same as they travel and migrate, but because clashes around Islamophobia and migration in the global North have specific geopolitical, economic, and cultural effects in the Middle East. In this work I single out the landmark research of Jasbir Puar (2007) on burgeoning forms of racist patriotism and militarism among Western LGBT movements, which she terms “homonationalism,” and on the centrality of the sexualized hypermasculinization of both the American soldier and the Muslim terrorist in the geopolitics of war. Fatima El-Tayeb (2004) works on German and European Union whiteness and neo-nationalism and the resistance of racialized queer communities in Europe to the ethnic cleansing of LGBT identities and national publics. Paola Bacchetta (2009) offers new frameworks for analyzing the organization of resistance among lesbians of color in France and their intersecting or co-formed struggles with post/neocolonialism, misogyny, Islamophobia, and homophobia.
Finally, Sunaina Maira (2009) works on Muslim South Asian youth masculinities and femininities in the contemporary United States as they struggle with similar intersections of Islamophobia and racism.

FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Feminist work on masculinity in the fields of critical international relations, critical security studies, and peace studies offers innovative methods for exploring security masculinities, the police, military, and surveillance subjects identified at the start of this essay. These subjects are also central concerns of the work on Islamophobia, nationalism, and war in the critical regional and diaspora studies literature I have just reviewed. The uniqueness of critical international relations and security studies is its focus on theorizing the nature and complex institutionalization of the state (in particular the national security apparatuses and the state at war). For these groups of scholars, masculinities are produced and reproduced within complex constructions of state institutions and security practices, which are internally contradictory and multi-dimensional. In contrast, many other fields of critical gender scholarship may see the state as a monolith or as a reflex or secondary artifact of broader cultural formations or political-economic structures.

international relations has also critiqued simplistic notions of the globalization and dissemination across borders of gender norms and the internationalization of postcolonial legal and governance norms arrayed around deviant masculinities (Amar 2011a, Goodale and Merry 2007). Also, this field has radically gendered international political-economy, reinserting questions of masculinity, sexual normativity, and gendered self-governance into the study of global finance and development (Bedford 2009, Peterson 2003). Thus, with its new breadth and set of critical methods, feminist international relations studies provides tools for analyzing the three kinds of masculinity subjects identified at the start of this piece. Security, paternafare, and workerist masculinities must be of particular concern to scholars of the contemporary Middle East.

CONCLUSION

During the first months of 2011, vernacular discourses of “men in crisis” structured much of the coverage of uprisings and revolutions in the Middle East and provided the shared interpretive lenses for many prominent bloggers—conservative and leftist, secular and religious within the Arab world and in the West. International and national institutions in the region reconfigured their gender industries in this time of revolution around the time-worn figures of the hypermasculine unruly Arab populace and the working-class sexual predator, as well as the humanitarian subjectivities of reformed paternafare fatherhood and maternal liberalism. Simultaneously, new mass social movements, often led by working-class women in the region, expressed forms of assertive subjectivity, including the ma'alima (bossy), jada'a (tough), shuja'a (fierce) “female masculinities” of militant women’s labor organizations. These groups clashed with the sexualized violence of police and security forces in January and February and, then, beginning in March, challenged the rigid paternalism of the transitional authority of the armed forces.

In this essay, I aim to capture the “masculinity crisis” framing of this time of transition and revolution and explore agendas emerging from distinct corners of the globe and from a variety of institutional locations that could prove fruitful for further research in masculinity studies. Middle East masculinity studies, in its popular-hegemonic forms, serves as an essential theater for the staging of war, repression,
humanitarian hypocrisy, and misunderstanding. Thus the reinvigoration of critical masculinity studies, in broad dialogue with other innovative fields, could play an essential role in remaking power and knowledge formations during a time of momentous political and social change.

NOTES


REFERENCES

Abaza, Mona

Abdalla, Mustafa

Abu-Lughod, Janet

Abu-Lughod, Lila

Afary, Janet
2009 Sexual Politics in Modern Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Agamben, Giorgio

Aghacy, Samira

Ali, Kamran Asdar

Al-Samman, Hanadi

Amar, Paul

Amin, Samir

Arondekar, Anjali

Babayan, Kathryn, and Afsaneh Najmabadi, eds.

Bacchetta, Paola

Baer, Mark

Barakat, Hoda

Basham, Victoria

Bayat, Asef
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/26/a_new_arab_street
(accessed on April 22, 2011).

Bayat, Asef, and Linda Herrera

Bederman, Gail

Bedford, Kate

Boellstorff, Tom

Brown, Wendy

Carver, Terrell

Carver, Terrell, and Jernej Pikalo, eds.

Coombes, Kate, and Eamon T. O’Connor

Crapanzano, Vincent

De Koning, Anouk
2009 Global Dreams: Class, Gender and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.

Dorfman, Ariel, and Armand Mattelart

Duggan, Lisa

Elliott, Andrea

El-Rouayheb, Khaled

El Shakry, Omnia

Elsheshtawy, Yasser

El-Tayeb, Fatima

Enloe, Cynthia

Epps, Bradley

Fahim, Kareem

Fahmy, Khaled

Foucault, Michel

Fry, Peter

Gana, Nouri
2010 Bourguiba’s sons: melancholy manhood in modern Tunisian cinema.

Ghannam, Farha

Ghoussoub, Mai, and Emma Sinclair-Webb, eds.

Goodale, Mark, and Sally Engle Merry

Gopinath, Gayatri

Green, James

Halberstam, Judith

Halperin, David M.

Harders, Cilja

Hasso, Frances S.

Hayes, Jarrod

Henry, Marsha

Heringer, Rosana, and Osmundo Pinho, eds.

Higate, Paul

Higate, Paul, and Marsha Henry


Hirschkind, Charles

Hooper, Charlotte

Hourani, Albert

Inhorn, Marcia C.

Inhorn, Marcia C., ed.

Jacob, Wilson C.

Jama, Afdhere

Jamal, Amina

Khalili, Laleh, and Jillian Schwedler, eds.

Kholoussy, Hanan

Kimmel, Michael S.

Kimmel, Michael, Jeff Hearn, and Robert Connell, eds.

Krajeski, Jenna

Lagrange, Frederic

Mahmood, Saba

Maira, Sunaina

Manalansan IV, Martin F.

Massad, Joseph

Mehrez, Samia

Mitchell, Timothy

Moutinho, Laura

Muñoz, José

Murray, Stephen, and Will Roscoe, eds.

Najmabadi, Afsaneh

Nandy, Ashis

Ouzgane, Lahoucine, ed.

Parker, Richard

Peterson, V. Spike
1997 Whose Crisis? Early and Postmodern Masculinism. In Innovation and Transformation in International Relations Theory, ed. Stephen Gill and

Pinho, Osmundo  

Puar, Jasbir  

Rawls Kristin  

Rieker, Martina  

Rodrigue, Aron  

Said, Edward  

Sen, Amartya  

Shafik, Viola  

Shah, Nayan  

Shepherd, Laura  


Singerman, Diane  

Singerman, Diane, and Paul Amar, eds.

Smith, Anna Marie

Tadiar, Neferti

Taylor, Charles

Tickner, J. Ann

Vigoya, Mara Viveros

Weldes, Jutta

Whitaker, Brian

Wilson, Ara

Wynn, Lisa L.

Zalewski, Marysia, and Jane L. Parpart
1998 The “Man” Question in International Relations. Westview Press.

Ze’evi, Dror