Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries

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INTRODUCTION

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ABSTRACT The introductory essay offers a brief overview of current trends in critical globalization studies and international relations scholarship that shed light on three intersections: between imperialism and humanitarianism, between neoliberal globalization and “rescue industry” transnationalism, and between patterns of geopolitical hegemony and trajectories of peacekeeping internationalism. These research agendas have been generative and politically useful, but have tended to neglect the forms of humanitarian and peacekeeping agency emanating from the global south. In order to address this gap, this introduction lays out a new research agenda that combines interdisciplinary methods from global studies, gender and race studies, critical security studies, police and military sociology, Third World diplomatic history, and international relations. This introduction also theoretically situates the other contributions and case studies gathered here, providing a framework of analysis that groups them into three clusters: (I) Globalizing Peacekeeper Identities, (II) Assertive “Regional Internationalisms,” and (III) Emergent Alternative Paradigms.

Keywords: global south, Third World, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, globalization, imperialism, hegemony, emerging countries, international security

On 28 March 2011, the Financial Times exclaimed “Libya, a last hurrah for the west?” (Rachman, 2011) and on 1 September, the Telegraph warned “Libya could be the last place where the West is allowed to intervene” (Joshi, 2011). Although the year 2011 offered a wealth of political-economic and diplomatic evidence that the foundations of global north/west hegemony were rapidly eroding, the period also featured an airstrike campaign against the Qaddafi regime that seemed to prove, spectacularly, that Western geopolitical and military dominance was still secure. The UN Security Council authorized NATO to use “all necessary
measures to protect civilians [in Libya] … and provide full humanitarian access to those in need” (UN News Centre, 2011). This militarized humanitarian intervention took the form of a new kind of operation, “the first real test of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine since its formal adoption by the United Nations in 2005” (Politics & Polity, 2011). But from the perspective of many observers based in emerging global-south countries, these interventions seemed more like a return to the past. How could a colonial-era style bombardment of North African cities by French, Italian, and US air forces fit into an age of multipolarism and “liberal peace?” How could a Cold War-type “contra” insurgency supported by US covert intelligence operators reconcile itself with the early-twenty-first-century universe of non-violent uprisings and vibrant new media solidarities?

Although NATO launched the intervention in Libya after seeking not just a UNSC authorization but also the consent of the once radical Cairo-based Arab League and the collaboration of the solidly reactionary Saudi-centered Gulf Cooperation Council, these global-south security communities did not design or direct the intervention. When the airstrikes did succeed in bringing down Qaddafi and ushering into power Libya’s rebel National Transitional Council in October 2011, NATO gloated and insisted that the new Council in Libya suspend the oil, trade, infrastructure, and industrial contracts won by Russia, Brazil, and South Africa who had not championed NATO’s intervention. Abdeljalil Mayouf, information manager at the Libyan rebel oil firm Agoco, told Reuters “we don’t have problems with Western countries like the Italians, French and UK companies. But we may have some political issues with Russia, China and Brazil” (RT News, 2011). These kinds of statement generated an enraged backlash and “very strong resistance” from these emerging global south powers including Brazil, South Africa, and India “which aspire to become permanent members of an expanded Security Council” (Charbonneau, 2011). The BRICS group promised either to never support another Security Council resolution of this kind or to control the character and terms of such humanitarian interventions, themselves, in the future. “Russia, China, Brazil, India and South Africa have repeatedly complained that the NATO intervention in Libya has gone far beyond the U.N. mandate approved by the council in March to protect civilians from violence by the government. They say they do not want the same thing to happen in Syria” (ibid). As an alternative, BRICS countries began pushing discussions for the scrapping of the UN authorization of force system and for a new set of mechanisms similar to those articulated by UN Rapporteur Richard Falk: “In the end, what becomes obvious is that such protective undertakings to achieve credibility in the future must be detached from geopolitics. The best mechanism for reaching such a goal would clearly involve the establishment of a UN Emergency Force that could be activated by a two-thirds vote in either the Security Council or General Assembly, and not be subject to the veto. Such UNEF would need to be funded independently, possibly by finally imposing some sort of UN revenue raising tax on international flights or currency transactions” (Falk, 2011).

Indeed, the massively militarized and global-north orchestrated humanitarian intervention in Libya (March-October 2011) interrupted a year of extraordinary shifts in patterns of globalization and international security that were pointing world order toward other horizons of possibility. The pro-democracy uprisings of the Arab Spring challenged neoliberal policies and deposed officials who had pushed radical forms of privatization and security policies that favored the West. The increasingly organized and influential African Union and South America’s revolutionary Bolivarian Alliance generated and aggressively advocated consensus- and global-south-based alternatives to Western and UN humanitarian militarism. And the rising economic and geopolitical powerhouses of Russia, China, India, and Brazil increased their
degree of autonomy in and around the Security Council, IMF, and other UN commissions and agencies. The emerging influence of global-south powers that had been gaining momentum for a decade reached a tipping point in 2011, inverting essential pillars of global hierarchy. Via internationalist mechanisms and institutions, emerging powers began establishing a degree of sway over the same northern countries that had once been their colonial masters. In 2011, China and Brazil proposed to channel money through the IMF to prop up the Eurozone economy, demanding favorable trade concessions and currency rates in exchange for their aid (Childress, 2011; Reuters, 2011). And while the US and Eurozone continued to fret about what they referred to as the “global” financial crisis, the finances of most of the global south just kept getting better, as economic growth shot up and debt burdens fell in Brazil, China, and even in much of Africa.

In terms of the growth of global-south participation in and leadership of humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions during this tumultuous year, the NATO-in-Libya model seemed an outlier that strayed far from the trend line. Indeed, alternative models and evidence of new kinds of frameworks constituted by the global south came from every continent. Brazil redeployed its military peacekeepers (who had led the UN MINUSTAH operations) from Haiti to the narcotrafficker-occupied slum communities of Rio de Janeiro to “pacify” the city for the upcoming World Cup and Olympic Games. Ethiopian and Nigerian humanitarian troops poured into the new border between North and South Sudan, substituting for Western operations. Venezuela again provided affordable oil to impoverished and unemployed US and European households during the record-cold winters that bracketed the year and provided disaster relief and humanitarian aid in Africa and South Asia. And Turkey and Indonesia seemed to be the only powers able to establish stable peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, with Ankara also leading international efforts to grapple with the humanitarian impact of civil strife in Syria, the nuclear program in Iran, and the devastating blockade of Gaza.

In the wake of the changes witnessed by this tumultuous year of humanitarian interventions, global-south uprisings, and peacekeeping innovations, this collection asks: What new roles are emergent powers of the global south playing in shaping new globalizing security industries, humanitarian interventions, and internationalist “peace enforcement” practices today?

Reviewing Traditions of Scholarship

In the twenty-first century, globalizing development agendas have become inseparable from internationalized, militarized, “securitized” interventions: aid missions embed themselves in walled police compounds (Duffield, 2001, 2007), international financial organizations focus on quelling insurgencies (Fox, 2008; Higate and Henry, 2009; Jones, 2008; Rosenau, 2009), and private investments flood the humanitarian intervention and protection sector (Abrahamson and Williams, 2010; Mandel, 2002). Recent studies have argued that this merging of developmentalism and securitization has been legitimized by the blending of discourses of humanitarianism and human security with neo-colonial metaphors of tutelage and protection (Doty 1996; Mamdani, 2010, 2011; Orford, 2003, 2011). This kind of humanitarianism, at the nexus of globalizing development and military intervention, increasingly demands that international enforcement (rather than mechanisms of entitlement or redistribution, for example) be mobilized regardless of the consent of its “recipient” populations (Orford, 1999; Amar, 2012).

Before this critical scholarship emerged, traditions of research on humanitarian intervention in political science, international relations, socio-legal studies, and global sociology focused on delimiting the red lines that national sovereignty must not cross. This literature provided legal
or technical expertise, proposing to get the balance right or assess the predicament or dilemma posed by the clash between international humanitarian imperatives and the sovereignty rights enjoyed by independent states in the international system (Ayoob, 1995). Constructivist accounts have mapped the origins of transformative dynamics emanating from below and outside state and legal institutions. The best of this important work grounds the emergence of interventionism in particular civil society mobilizations, class interests, cultural value flows, and elite actor networks (Hehir, 2008; Kaldor, 2007; Santos and Rodrigues-Garavito, 2005). Another productive set of debates has explored the nature of transnational norm-dissemination practices and patterns of ideological contestation (Adamson, 2005; Acharya, 2004). Historically oriented work has identified three ages of humanitarianism: the age of nineteenth century Abolition through the World War I age of minority protection and ethno-national self-determination (Brown, 2006; Rodogno, 2011); the age of World War II justice and post-War humanitarian law codifications (Aksar, 2004); and the post-Cold War era when militarized humanitarian interventions have proliferated (Barnett, 2005; Razack, 2004). Scholarly research on these three ages of humanitarian intervention have tended to focus on the agents and agendas of global-north powers and humanitarian social movements emanating from metropolitan capitals.

Since 2000, a new body of scholarship has revealed the imperialist dynamics behind the wave of new humanitarian interventions unleashed since the Cold War ended. One group has elaborated a critique of new appropriations of the Kantian doctrine of “liberal peace.” The contemporary version of this doctrine asserts that the protection of individual liberties and human rights trumps the traditional Realpolitik sanctification of state security and national sovereignty. This new wave of critical scholarship has argued that global-north powers since the end of the Cold War have used the doctrine of “liberal peace” to launch, paradoxically, an unending series of new wars. Despite the fact that they are labeled as humanitarian interventions, these deployments reveal the resurging imperial ambitions of US and European military powers (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Chandler, 2004; Falk, 1995, 1999; Lidén, 2009). Complementing these conversations, a group of more theoretically oriented scholars has explored the constitution of discourses and subjects of power around the “liberal peace” regime, drawing upon the work of Michel Foucault and profiling the biopolitical, disciplinary, paternalistic, and “therapeutic” dimensions of new kinds of humanitarian militarism (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Esmeir, 2007; Pupavac, 2005). In parallel, another group of “globalization studies” researchers has analyzed the political-economic structures that have enabled these new kinds of humanitarianized globalization and domination (Harvey, 2003; Nederveen Pieterse, 2004). Related the scholarship on “the development/security nexus” has focused its critique on European or North American interventions, particularly in states occupied in times of war, or in so-called “failed states” that require “nation building” where national sovereignty is weak and imperial legacies are strong (Bilgin and Morton, 2002; Boás and Jennings, 2007; Chesterman, 2005; Duffield, 2007; Fearon and Laitin, 2004; Krasner, 2004; Pouigny, 2005).

Together, these sets of projects have provided useful correctives and cautions that offer powerful alternatives designed to counter the arguments of a highly visible and influential group of intervention cheerleaders. Since 2001, these intervention advocates have established a troubling space of consensus between prominent figures of the human-rights left and the neoconservative right (Hitchens et al., 2008; Ignatieff, 2003).

However, what this cluster of research agendas have left relatively unexamined is the role of global-south states and “Third World”-originating transnational formations. Global-south actors are neglected as agents of innovation and are largely seen as the recipients or victims of Eurocentric agendas. Meanwhile, the great majority of new studies that have committed to highlighting the rise of the global south have focused overwhelmingly on general issues of economic
growth and market expansion, especially on the BRICs’ (Brazil, Russian, India, and China and sometimes South Africa) state-coordinated development and trade policies. The few but important exceptions to this economistic trend have examined the rise of “middle powers” (Joordan, 2003), “global rebalancing” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2011), the return of historical patterns of global south power (Korany, 1994), and the rise of new emancipatory models of global governance coming from the south (Al Attar and Miller, 2010; Gill, 2008; Lidén et al., 2009). In order to build on this nascent set of conversations and to address these gaps in the literature on humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and the security/development nexus, we in this collection focus on emergent powers in the global south that are transforming and deploying distinct internationalist security and militarized humanitarian development models. This collection aims to introduce globalization studies to new trends in police and military studies, highlight the cultural and political complexities of the global south, and develop new frameworks that articulate the best of feminist, political-economic, international relations, and ethnographic perspectives.

**Objects and Methodologies of Analysis**

The studies grouped together here will highlight three units of analysis: *Pivotal countries in the global south* (India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, etc.) that have developed an internationalist profile and are asserting themselves increasingly as humanitarian, peacekeeping, and “policekeeping” actors on the world stage in ways that also promote their own economic globalization agendas and shift transnational patterns of norms diffusion; *global-south based transnational private networks of security-and-development contractors* that bring together elites and subaltern personnel from sites which served as laboratories for anti-communism and extreme neoliberalism (Fiji, Iraq, Colombia, El Salvador); and *community, paramilitary, and insurgent groupings in the global south* (Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Indonesia) whose agency in engaging or resisting security-and-development missions has transformed the terms and aims of the international frameworks of humanitarianism as well as the globalizing “rescue industry.”

This collection showcases a group of scholars who have been shaped by extensive first-hand experience in the global south. This group is unusual because each member has worked within security-development missions and/or in international institutions and has done interviews and participatory fieldwork among community members, aid recipients, state actors, and international humanitarian officials. This multi-dimensional experience means that our work does not idealize the humanitarian aims of interventions, nor does it romanticize possibilities for resistance or agency on the part of the clients or targets of these missions. On the other hand, these studies also resist the urge to see these operations as reproducing, wholesale, any singular, imperial, global logic. In order to capture the complexity of structural forces and agency dynamics that make the rescue industry in the global south so interesting, many of these projects combine ethnography with political-economic or social-historical analysis, providing clearer understandings of transnational forms of class identity and domination, militarized masculinity and femininity, as well as fetishized ethnic and minority identities. Each piece offers evidence of the shifting logics of security states in the global south. This collection, although resisting any neat narratives of imperialism, does not hesitate to examine how security institutions in the south engage with local and global forms of capitalism, dispossession, exploitation, and occupation. And we provide new insights on how states in the global south are shifting the terms of political internationalism and economic globalization through their projects for police reform, military civilianization, and humanitarian deployment.
Arrangement of Contributions

These studies are arranged into three subsections: (I) Globalizing Peacekeeper Identities, (II) Assertive “Regional Internationalisms,” and (III) Emergent Alternative Paradigms. The first group of authors takes as its unit of analysis not individual global-south countries, but the identities and subjectivities of peacekeeping troops themselves. These multinational groupings are analyzed as they cross borders, interact with officers from other countries, assume and challenge forms of power, and respond to (or precipitate) conflict. The three studies in this group analyze the gender dimensions of peacekeeping troops coming from the global south and their insertion into global hierarchies of labor, race, and post-colonial identity. This section builds on the extraordinary contributions of feminist and critical race theory scholars to the study of humanitarian intervention and critical security studies (Ackerly and True, 2008; Carey, 2001; Cohn, 2008; Enloe, 2004; Gill 2008; Shepherd, 2010; Whitworth, 2004).

Marsha Henry’s study of female peacekeeping troops from India and Uruguay sent to Liberia and Haiti opens this collection because its findings serve as a caution against utopian readings of new kinds of internationalism articulated by global-south powers. Henry offers a fine-grained analysis of interventions that explicitly represent themselves as new and emancipatory kinds of internationalism. These interventions are led by women soldiers from the global south, and they are charged with realizing a gender-sensitive human-security mission. As implied by the provocative title of her piece, “Peacexploitation,” Henry is skeptical of the emancipatory claims asserted by the organizers of these missions. She reminds us that global race/gender geographies of neoliberalism have systematically hyper-exploited women’s work within new global divisions of labor. Outsourcing work to Indian women is a central pattern of contemporary production chains. So when the humanitarian rescue industry operates along the same lines as transnational corporations and shifts jobs to South Asian women, why should we assume this is an emancipatory move free of globalized patterns of exploitation? Henry takes seriously the possibility that there is no geopolitical shift toward counter-hegemony going on here, nor any significant trend toward gender empowerment. However, Henry does not simply return us to a totalizing critique of neoliberal globalization or imperialist humanitarianism. Her nuanced reading of films, news reports, and the efforts of women soldiers and police officers, along with her analysis of mobilizations and subjectivities of women “aid recipients” in Liberia and Haiti, reveals that new subjects of gendered power and struggle are indeed emerging. In this light, we can imagine possible intersections that can challenge the hierarchies that militarized humanitarianism is now fostering under the guise of “global sisterhood” and “global-south emergence.”

Paul Higate’s analysis interrogates the revival of colonial notions of “martial race” and the production of novel, global forms of “militarized masculinity” in and around the mercenary sector (a.k.a. the “private security contractor” sector or “private military company” sector). Many books and articles have traced the increasing roles played by mercenary firms, such as the company formerly known as Blackwater, in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan wars and occupations (Pelton, 2007; Scahill, 2008). Studies sympathetic to the private security/military sector celebrate their efficiency and flexibility, while critics underline their propensity to feed into war profiteering, participating in protection racketeering, and generating violence against civilians in a climate of economic deregulation and juridical impunity. These transnational mercenary firms are highly likely to be viewed with suspicion if not loathing by civilian populations as well as by their underpaid and overworked colleagues in the uniformed military. This study focuses on the disaster response, pacification operations, and humanitarian interventions deployed by these private security forces, identifying particular national subgroups from Fiji,
Chile, and El Salvador that are overrepresented within the armed personnel of these companies. Complementing, but going in a different direction from Henry’s piece above, Higate theorizes how male soldiers from these three countries make an “ethnic bargain,” that is, they cash in on colonial or dictatorship-era notions of predatory masculinity and atavistic raciality that in their home countries are banished to a dark past of death squads and repression. But in the global mercenary economy, Higate argues, these abjected, martial, racialized masculinities become valuable currency exchanged for high wages in the private-sector warrior economy. This provocative case study demonstrates that the most anti-democratic forms of “global south to the rescue” are renaturalized, commodified, and rendered globally powerful through the racial and gender logics of the mercenary sector.

Ryerson Christie also highlights forms of ambivalence and the persistence of coloniality in his study of the gendering of Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the racialized feminization of their supposedly “helpless” aid recipients in Afghanistan. Christie’s study maps the liberal logic of intervention and its necessarily gendered grammar, as it inserts local aid recipients into discourses of gendered dependency. Recipients’ roles as converted insurgents are represented ideally as passive and controllable when confronted with a Western military occupation that has shifted from a “kinetic” kill-oriented mission to a humanitarian intervention. The shift from kinetic to humanitarian is also understood to incorporate the Western male soldier in a process of feminization. This supposed feminization of the military is represented by counterinsurgency discourse as driven by the agency of global south actors, that is, by the occupied populations themselves. Their voices, languages, needs, and cultural claims are represented as driving and shaping the actions of the PRTs. These humanitarian counterinsurgency teams come to play the nodal role of channeling these southern voices and needs toward counterinsurgency goals and in redirecting the militarized masculinities of occupiers toward development aims that are more culturally appropriate. Christie’s analysis provocatively reveals perhaps the most hollowed-out form of “global south to the rescue,” where the PRTs wholly stage subaltern agency and stretch fabricated humanitarian doctrines to the breaking point in order to justify the extension of a futile and unpopular occupation.

The second group of analyses provides case studies of the growing importance of emergent middle powers that have begun shaping new kinds of internationalism, primarily through interventions concentrated in their own regional or continental context. Through these newly framed and innovatively justified forms of cooperation and intervention, these mid-sized global-south powers have redefined not just humanitarianism, but also shifted patterns of economic and social globalization as well as the norms and identities of transnational religious communities.

Reşat Bayer and Fuat Keyman’s study of Turkey profiles that country’s increasingly autonomous role in defining peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and post-crisis security and development aid in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Central Asian regions. Ankara’s new forms of internationalism and humanitarian leadership have begun to break down what were regarded as irreconcilable antinomies: European integration versus Islamic solidarity, global-south ascendance versus NATO stability, and neo-Ottoman nostalgia versus a commitment to internationalist secular-modernism. This study places in context recent high-profile controversies attached to Turkey’s new wave of internationalism and interventionism, including its stand-off with Israel over the blockade of Gaza and the commando raid on Turkish aid boats sent to help Palestinians, and the deal made by Turkey and Brazil to block sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program. Bayer and Keyman’s analysis also provides a historical and political framework for analyzing the evolution of newly assertive forms of Turkish humanitarian internationalism through a study of Turkey’s participation in recent peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan.
Alice Hills focuses on the cultures and behavior of West African police and peacekeeping officers and thus returns to some of the themes raised in the first set of “practitioner-focused” studies above. But she applies her findings to a broader national-level assessment of the role of Nigeria, a large and increasingly influential regional power. Hills’s piece investigates the degree to which Nigerian peacekeeping police forces articulate a global security culture consonant with liberal internationalist norms. Through a careful examination of individual interventions associated with Nigeria’s “big brother” role in conflict resolution in the region of West Africa, Hills finds that Nigeria’s humanitarian and peacekeeping practices represent a hybrid and ultimately conjunctive fabric woven from four clusters of elements: site-specific pragmatic adaptations, the individual ambitions of rent-seeking leaders, institutional yearnings to accumulate expensive equipment and prestigious training, and state-level tactics aimed at achieving short-term foreign policy objectives. Nigeria’s case, Hills argues, underlines the need for scholars and policymakers to look beyond the transnational rescue industry’s celebration of liberal-norm globalisation and human-security consensus. We must look critically at the notion that there exists a globalizing security culture or humanitarian system of norms and remain very cautious as we examine the possibility that major global-south participation in these interventions will either change this global culture in the long term or invent a new internationalist framework.

Jonathan Agensky and Joshua Barker’s in-depth analysis of Indonesia cautiously argues, in contrast to Hills’s piece, that emerging regional global-south powers are indeed reshaping dynamic patterns of norm globalisation, in more than just short-term or narrowly instrumentalist ways. As depicted here, Indonesia’s military, police, and diplomatic elites today are contributing to the erection of new multilateral and ultimately international forms and norms of humanitarianism and peacekeeping. Paradoxically, conflict within and between illiberal institutions and organizations (police services, military forces, ethno-religious militant groups, etc.) drive Indonesia’s participation in and reconceptualization of the global structure of “liberal peace.” Agensky and Barker’s analysis places Indonesia’s new regional and international assertions into historical context. They review the legacy of the Bandung Conference and Indonesia’s role in the rise of Third Worldism in the 1950s (and the revival of Bandung nostalgia in the current moment). Agensky and Barker also examine the relatively success of the Association of South-East Asian Nations in peacekeeping activities during the late-twentieth century. And they trace the rise of entrepreneurialism and transnational circulation of Indonesian police and military forces since the Asian financial crisis of 1997.

Jan Bachmann offers a groundbreaking study of Kenya which is, like Indonesia, an emerging regional power with increasing international visibility. As in the Indonesia case, this analysis explores how the push and pull of the more illiberal tendencies of globalization animate participation in regional peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations. Bachmann’s methodology carefully mixes an economic and political geography of Kenyan political elites with a history of Kenya’s position as a hub of globalization and of violent cross-border trade and exchange. In this context, “globalization” is described not primarily as a means for disseminating a system of normative and international-law constraints that limit or inform national sovereignty. Instead, globalization represents structures of opportunity within which postcolonial polities position themselves to consolidate “stateness” and some form of sovereignty in the contentious global market and hierarchical international arena. And, in this case, this form of stateness is more repressive, economically oligarchic, and less politically liberal (providing military training to Somali youth and using counterterrorism tactics against its own civilians in Kenya, for example) precisely because of the state’s insertion into humanitarian and peacekeeping
Interventions. Bachmann’s study of Kenya reminds us that the ascendance of global-south agency in the transnational rescue industry and the global humanitarian order may render Third World states more powerful, but does not necessarily take us any farther down the road toward the democratization of global governance.

The third group of contributions gathered here takes us to three emergent or re-emergent internationalist powers: the “Bolivarian Bloc” (consisting primarily of Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia), Brazil, and Egypt. These new or renewed internationalists claim, explicitly, to be in the business of generating new, counter-hegemonic frameworks for humanitarian militarism and international order. Research presented in each of these studies assesses these claims carefully and sets them into historical and institutional context, drawing upon in-depth familiarity with military cultures, diplomatic histories, and globalization patterns that inform these emergent forms of assertiveness.

Thomas Muhr’s study explores the attempts of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA) to generate a military wing that espouses a radical form of humanitarian interventionist ideology. Until now, ALBA has served primarily as an economic and ideological grouping that aims to channel profits from Venezuelan oil sales toward social projects in politically sympathetic countries. As Muhr argues, the new aims of ALBA on the humanitarian-peacekeeping front are not to simply enlarge or refine international missions so that the group can provide more durable peace or more effective disaster relief. Instead, ALBA’s aim is to fundamentally transform the notion of humanitarian internationalism so that it aims for long-term, emancipatory structural transformation. Standing against the paternalistic, self-serving, and dependency-producing notions of protection and aid fostered by the transnational rescue industry’s liberal-imperialist agenda, ALBA advocates a new humanitarian internationalism based on assuring economic and social rights for all and constructing a New International Economic Order. ALBA sees the ultimate source of conflict and humanitarian disaster as the acute poverty caused by “totalitarian” forms of capitalist globalization.

Although often identified with the leftist-populist “Pink Wave” that has swept Latin America since the late 1990s, Brazil has committed to vastly expanded roles in global humanitarian operations and peacekeeping missions that are quite distinct from those proposed by ALBA. Brazil’s new internationalist practices and doctrines reflect, in part, the legacies of the military dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s as well as the older embedded “imperialist” economic interests that derive from its historic connections to other former Portuguese colonies in Africa and the East Indies. Alejandro Nieto’s detailed study takes us inside the diplomatic and commercial negotiations, political-institutional bargains, and strategic compromises that have driven Brazil’s highly visible roles in peacekeeping in East Timor and in humanitarian aid and pacification in Haiti, where Brazil led the UN military operations between 2004 and 2011. In order to set these missions in context, Nieto reviews the country’s Imperialist Period, which began when the Brazilian Empire became independent of Portugal in 1822 and extended through the first decades of the plantation-centered republic until the 1930s. Nieto then notes the transformations that occurred (and the continuities that persisted) as expansionist imperial culture adapted to the socialist-statism of the Estado Novo, participated in Allied expeditions during World War II, and exerted repressive power during the military dictatorship at home from 1964–1985. In this historical light, Nieto offers a more cautious reading of Brazil’s participation in contemporary peacekeeping missions and ambition to become a permanent member on the Security Council. Although recognizing the importance of history, Nieto insists that the mix of new nationalism and revived interests in expansionism and
interventionism that characterize Brazil’s participation in humanitarian missions cannot be understood as merely an echo of the past. Driven by new domestic and transnational social movements that challenge imperialist legacies and the military’s participation in politics, and endowed with a strong sense of solidarity with developing countries’ dilemmas (particularly those of Africa and the black nations of the West Indies), Brazil promises to play a truly transformative role, advocating new forms of globalization and interventionism in the years ahead.

In the final contribution in this collection, we turn to Egypt, which moved to the center of concerns about the social impact of globalization and the role of the military in “rescuing” civilian populations from severe repression during the mass uprisings, the Tahrir Square demonstrations, and the frustrated revolution of 2011. Paul Amar’s analysis provides a detailed history of the rise and fall (and, perhaps, rise again) of forms of “Egyptian Globalism” that have thrived at the intersection of military institutions, cosmopolitan legalist cultures, and social movements backing broader processes of decolonization and “Third Worldist” non-alignment. This piece reminds the reader that the first UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Emergency Force, was created in Egypt after the Tripartite Agression of 1956 with the explicit aim of enabling decolonization (and preventing the militarized recolonization) of Egypt. Tracing the military history of Egyptian international interventions in Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Middle East, and Mediterranean Europe, Amar highlights the moments where Egypt pushed the formation of new norms of Third Worldism, socialism, and Pan-Arabism in the mid-twentieth century, and then of militarized neoliberalism and new forms of humanitarian paternalism in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries. Amar also examines the post-Camp David, pre-2011 Revolution period during which Egypt’s militarized humanitarianism turned inward, as its armed forces focused on entrepreneurial and development activities at home. During that period, Egyptian Globalism continued to thrive and shape world politics through the agency of assertive UN-system leaders from Egypt. By recovering these histories, and tracing the contentious politics between developmentalism and internationalism in and around the armed forces, the findings presented here reveal the origins of the Egyptian military’s oligarchical economic self-interest and, thus, the institutional cultures driving its severely repressive actions against anti-corruption and pro-democracy protesters. But on a more optimistic note, this study also provides insights into the country’s capacity to generate powerful, transnationally linked humanitarian and human-rights movements and alternative normative regimes that could, perhaps, push significant sections of the military and diplomatic elites in new directions in the years to come.

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