

The Unfolding Crisis in Punjab, March-August 1947: Key Turning Points and British Responses

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The creation of Pakistan in August 1947 synchronised with the Partition of Bengal and the Punjab. The partition of these regions was an episode marked with communal turbulence causing large-scale massacre and migration. The Colonial Punjab, given its geo-strategic importance and the status as the 'granary of India' makes it a worthwhile subject of study on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Indian partition. The Partition of Punjab with all the tragedy it entailed is riddled with complexity and conflicting interpretations. These persist even six decades after its occurrence. This paper looks afresh at the crucial period from March to August 1947, utilising primary material drawn from the Mountbatten archives. It seeks to understand the rising tide of communalism within the province, the responses of the British administration to this and the extent to which actions of local political leaders were compromised because of pressures from All-India leadership.

Introductory Background

Conventional accounts link communal difference with the granting of separate electorates in 1909.¹ While this has some validity for All-India understandings, a different political trajectory existed in Punjab. This stemmed from the fact that the colonial authorities wanted to encourage Hindu-Sikh-Muslim unity in the rural areas of the province. Such social cohesion would secure the stability of the 'sword arm' and 'granary' of British India. From 1857 onwards the British sought to co-opt the rural power holders. That bond got cemented when Punjab became the main recruitment area for the Indian Army from 1880s onwards.² Thus while in the urban setting of Punjab there were similarities with developments in for example UP,³ as a result of the impact of competitive religious revivalisms,⁴ in the countryside the British engineered cross-community alliances through electoral division of the population along the lines of 'agriculturalist' and 'non-agriculturalist.' This terminology lay at the heart of the 1900 Punjab Alienation of Land Act⁵ which served to ensure rural stability by preventing the expropriation of landowners by urban moneylenders. The result was that two types of politics emerged in colonial Punjab. In the towns there was emphasis on religious community, whereas in the countryside, cross-cutting allegiances had been the mainstay of politics.⁶

The advent of the Unionist Party in 1923 provided the political articulation to the rural interest group with unequivocal support from the British. The

Unionist Party remained at the helm in the Punjab for a quarter of a century till 2nd March 1947. It drew support from the rural Punjab cutting across the religious and caste as well as kinship allegiances. The political elite of all three communities had conjoined under the banner of the Unionist Party. Given the political arithmetic of colonial Punjab, the Unionist Party was able to predominate up to the 1946 provincial elections. During that period the urban-based parties were marginalised. The territorial integrity of the Punjab remained the priority to such an extent that the only proposal for a possible redrawing of the Punjab boundaries was put forward in 1932 by Geoffrey Corbett, Chief Secretary of the Punjab. He suggested to the minority commission in the Second Round Table Conference that the Ambala Division excluding District Simla, be separated from the Punjab and attached to the United Provinces. By doing so, Muslims would have a decisive majority with 63 percent of population, which Corbett thought, would guarantee stability and peace in the Punjab.⁷ That scheme did not find favour with the minority commission as it was considered detrimental to bring about such a change in the geography of the province given that it might have caused a communal imbalance. Sikh representatives at the round table conference, Sampuran Singh and Ujjal Singh in a bid to counteract Corbett's suggestion proposed Multan and Rawalpindi divisions to be separated from the Punjab and attached to NWFP.⁸ Subsequently however both of them did not press the point and instead proposed 30 percent representation for the Sikhs in the forthcoming Punjab Assembly.

However the Muslim League's raising of the Pakistan demand from 1940 did encourage further Sikh reappraisal and some discussion of possible territorial reorganisation involving the creation of what was termed Azad Punjab. Master Tara Singh was its main protagonist. The same demand was pleaded by the Sikh All Parties Committee in a Memorandum, handed over to Sir S. Cripps on March 31, 1942.⁹ Like other proposals that too fizzled out, as dividing Punjab in accordance with the wishes of Sikhs involved practical hazard for the British. Suffice it to say the voices raised for cutting the Punjab asunder remained peripheral till the fall of the Khizr Ministry on 2nd March 1947.

Khizr had been under mounting pressure from 1944 onwards. He sought support from the British to offset the mounting Muslim League campaign. While British officials in Punjab were personally favourable to the Unionist cause, the view from New Delhi was less favourable. This was because of the desire for an All-India settlement between the Muslim League and the Congress and the feeling that the Unionists could not be allowed to stand in its way. With the end of the War, the Unionist Party's usefulness to the British further diminished. As Talbot states 'although Wavell and Mountbatten still found Khizr personally charming and certainly much better company than Jinnah, his views were dismissed as irrelevant and anachronistic.'¹⁰ His call that Punjab should remain undivided proved to be a cry in the wilderness. Unionist stalwarts, *Pirs* and *Sajjada Nashins*¹¹ with sprawling *jagirs* and the overriding influence they wielded over multitudes of their *murids* (disciples), were gradually switching sides and joining League *en masse*. A dynamic body like

the Muslim Student Federation reached out to every nook and cranny of the rural Punjab and disseminated the consciousness of religious differentiation among the village folks. Slogans like *Muslim hai to Muslim League mein Aa* and *Pakistan ka Matlab Kia La illah ha ill lallah* created a perfect setting for the League to give a mass appeal to the demand for a separate state for the Muslims. Thereby the League moved from political insignificance in 1937 to a position of incredible strength in 1946. Its phenomenal success, polling 75.26 per cent of the votes as against the Unionists who managed to obtain only 26.61 per cent of the votes in the 1946 elections bore testimony to its soaring popularity among the Muslim community. By securing 75 out of 86 Muslim seats, Muslim League emerged as the single largest party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Quite conversely the Unionist Party which had won 96 seats previously now could bag no more than paltry 18 seats.¹² The rump Unionist Party nevertheless formed a coalition with Congress and the Akalis.¹³

Khizr found the premiership of the province no less than a bed of thorns. Muslim League's call for a province wide strike (hartal) on the very day the Ministry was sworn in did not augur well for the future of the new dispensation. Merely two days had elapsed when the traitor's day was observed, to the utter embarrassment to Khizr.¹⁴ However, despite all the hazards he managed to ward off direct action of the Muslim League and successfully preserved peace in the Punjab. Khizr's political outlook, articulated in his 'instinctive and pragmatic consociationalism'¹⁵ ran out of relevance for the British particularly in the context of their political expediencies at the All-India level. Even at the Punjab level, the agreement between the League and the Panthic Party was considered more vital for the stability of the province. As such a possibility could not be realized hence the Khizr Ministry was the solitary option for the British, which they accepted with grit. Nevertheless Khizr's loyalty towards the British did not falter. He went even to the extent of suggesting 'that in the last resort the Punjab should be declared a dominion and maintain direct relations with the crown after the British departure.'¹⁶ He kept on disseminating that idea with unflinching doggedness. However, with bellicose organizations like the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), the Muslim League National Guards and the Sikh Akali Fauj flouting the law recurrently, situation in the province was precariously poised.

The fall of the Khizr Ministry was hastened when on 24th January 1947 the ban was clamped on the Muslim League National Guards and the RSS. The Muslim League leadership, in retaliation, resorted to direct action in the Punjab. Processions were taken out in utter disregard to the prohibition by the government on such an activity. Without demur Punjab Muslim League leaders, Iftikhar ud Din, Mumtaz Daultana and Shaukat Hayat courted arrest, leading to strikes in Lahore and other major cities. The situation vitiated to such an extent that Khizr was unnerved and 'forced to come to terms with the League by lifting the ban on the processions and meetings'.¹⁷ He finally tendered his resignation, bringing an era of Unionist rule to a close.

The fall of the Khizr ministry marked a crucial turning point in Punjab politics. In this section we will both explain the reasons for this and assess its significance. Controversy surrounds the introduction of Governor's Rule, rather than the swearing of a purely Muslim League ministry following Khizr's resignation. Can this be seen as a hindrance to cooperation between Punjabi politicians which might have prevented the bloodletting which accompanied the British departure? Or is it rather a question of their inability to agree because of local power rivalries, or having their hands tied by the All-India leaderships?

Khizr's resignation occurred to the background of both a mounting Muslim League Direct Action campaign against him and Prime Minister Clement Attlee's announcement on 20th February 1947 stating the British intention of transferring power in the Indian Subcontinent by June 1948. The Punjab Governor Evan Jenkins¹⁸ reported to Wavell on 3rd March:

Khizr's anxiety about his position was increased by the Muslim League agitation, and increased still further by HMG's announcement on 20th February. The announcement shook Khizr severely and after an attempt to 'laugh it off' on 21st he became increasingly gloomy.¹⁹

Khizr's exit raised the political stakes in the key province of Punjab and removed the lingering hopes that Khizr held for a continued British presence in India. The fall of the Unionist Ministry removed the barrier to communal violence overwhelming the Punjab. The province's descent into violence began with the riots in Lahore and Amritsar and these spread quickly to the Multan division.

Punjab Politicians and National Leadership Constraints on a Local Settlement

Khizr was under no illusions even when he was in office regarding the declining popularity of his ministry particularly among the Punjab Muslims. He stated quite succinctly to Jenkins that 'in the Punjab, parliamentary majorities mean very little and that what matters is the strength of the 'sanctions' behind a Ministry.' If that ambiguous allusion is re-phrased in simpler terms one can easily get to the point Khizr was making. In the words of Jenkins himself, he meant that 'no Punjab ministry can be stable unless it commands not merely a majority in the Assembly but a majority in the major communities in the Province as a whole.'²⁰ Therefore he already had made up his mind to relinquish power in any case although he might have contemplated to continue till April or May.²¹ However, parliamentary majority notwithstanding, Khizr could not even see the Budget session through that was scheduled on the 3rd March. Bhim Sen Sacher and Swaran Singh were simply shocked to know Khizr's intentions. They wanted Khizr to have gone through with the budget session as previously proposed.²² What seemed imminent in the prevailing political polarisation was the enforcement of the Section 93 whereby all the discretionary power would be vested in the Governor.

Khizr was also in favour of biding a little more time instead of tendering immediate resignation. He knew as did Jenkins that Iftikhar Hussain Khan Mamdot would be unable to form a Ministry. He was aware of the ignorance of Muslim league leadership about the strength of Hindu and Sikh feelings against them. In such an atmosphere of ill-will the political impasse was imminent. In that case Section 93 would be the only option but 'which might prove awkward indeed.'²³ He also was nursing a wish of acting as a 'bridge' between the Muslim League and the non-Muslims, which did not seem possible either. Jenkins while briefing Wavell about the prevailing uncertainty, stated on 3rd March:

He did not feel that the unnatural coalition ministry could continue for very long and he was not disposed to lead the Congress and the Panthic Sikhs during the Budget Session only to make it clear to them immediately afterwards that he intended to break the Ministry. He felt that if he attempted to act as a 'bridge', he could do nothing effective, and in the meantime communal relations would inevitably worsen.²⁴

In the circumstance obtaining in the wake of Khizr's resignation Jenkins earnestly wanted Mamdot to form a Government. However he was well aware of the serious consequences it might entail that could 'include an early Section 93 situation.' He thought so despite a firm conviction that the undiluted Muslim rule as the League was envisaging would not last for more than a few weeks. He was fully cognizant of the fact that the only Government which could keep the Punjab steady till June 1948 had to represent a large section of all the major communities or at least the vast majority of the Muslims and the Sikhs.

Jenkins held meetings with the leaders of all three communities, with some hope to put together a multi-communal ministry. However his meetings with Sachar and Swaran Singh were not at all promising. Both of them made no secret of their unwillingness to cooperate with the Muslim League and espoused section 93 instead. They entertained serious doubts about the League's attitude towards the minorities in case it came to power. Sachar did not show any inclination to lend support to Mamdot. Swaran Singh was even more categorical. He went to the extent of saying 'The Sikhs have no plan of being treated as serfs under Muslim Masters and felt that they were strong enough to defend themselves.'²⁵ A statement to the same effect was issued subsequently by Baldev Singh in his letter to Wavell, stating that 'the Sikh cannot and will not join any Ministry if it is now formed by the Muslim League.'²⁶

Given such a state of political uncertainty, Jenkins knew that 'unless the Muslim League leaders could deal with minorities as Punjabis negotiating with the Punjabis'²⁷, they would hardly make any progress. Besides, Jenkins desperately wanted the Ministry to be formed well in time so that the budget could be passed. Mamdot did not give any assurances in the course of his conversation with Jenkins on 3rd March. Even the moderate Baldev Singh among the Sikh leadership made no bones about the unacceptability of the

League Ministry in the Punjab. In a despatch to Lord Wavell he denounced League in fairly strong words:

We have built up a Coalition there (Punjab), after much labour and great care. It was an inter-communal Ministry, held up as a model by the highest personages. The League had not been kept out as is falsely stated in its quarters. On the contrary, it was asked to join and the invitation was always there. It remained out because of its deliberate design to dominate the Province- and to this neither Sikhs nor Unionists nor could Congress agree. It was for such exclusive communal domination that the present move was made. The proof, if any were needed that their intentions are not clean when they now seek our collaboration, is their refusal to collaborate in the coalition. For that reason the Sikhs cannot and will not join any Ministry if it is now formed by the Muslim League.²⁸

Khizr was spot on when once he termed himself along with his Unionist Muslim colleagues as 'acting as a buffer'²⁹ between the League and the minority communities. Immediately after that buffer was removed communal frenzy broke loose. The episode of Tara Singh brandishing a sword on the steps of Punjab Assembly building on 3rd March ignited the tinderbox of communal animosity. The situation deteriorated further when 'the Panthic Party passed a resolution that it would fight Pakistan to the last drop of its blood.'³⁰ The anti-Pakistan demonstration by Hindu and Sikh students in Anarkali Bazaar Lahore added further venom to the mutual alienation amongst the communities.³¹ Widespread rioting was the upshot of all these aggressive overtones which spread out to Amritsar within a week. Four thousand Muslim shops were burned down in the walled city. That act of aggression evoked a sharp response in the Western Punjab particularly in Multan and Rawalpindi Divisions where scattered Hindu and Sikh communities had fallen victim to vicious attacks from the Muslims.³² There, the minority formed, in Horowitz's terms 'unprotected segments of strong groups.'³³ The death count was 3000 whereas 40,000, mostly Sikhs, had to seek shelter in the refugee camps.³⁴ Ravinder Kaur quotes A B Hansen's figures of the casualties in the month of March according to which 2,090 people died and 1,142 were seriously injured.³⁵

In the three districts of Attock, Rawalpindi and Jhelum property losses amounted to between 40 to 50 *crores* of rupees.³⁶ The Rawalpindi massacre, as it has been referred to in official correspondence, left behind a legacy of distrust and hatred, which, along with the fall of Khizr Ministry sealed the fate of the united Punjab.

Communal disturbances were not confined only to the North Western or the central districts. The violence also erupted towards the end of March and continued well into April in the south eastern district of Gurgaon. Initially the trouble began at *Hodal*, a small town at the Southern end of the district but it soon spread into other parts of Gurgaon. Dispute over the theft of a buffalo led to a pitched battle between *Ahirs* and *Meos* on communal lines. A large area on

the border of the Gurgaon district and Alwar State was badly affected and many villages, both Hindu and Muslim, were burnt to ashes. The total death toll in the district was around 100. After a few days 36 dead bodies of Meos were found in a *nallah* near a village named *Dharu Hera*. There was also some evidence of Alwar state aiding Ahirs against the Meos forcing Punjab Government to turn to the Political Department to intervene. Order was eventually restored only after three battalions were sent to Gurgaon district.³⁷

Ironically Muslim League leaders like Ghazanfer Ali Khan and Feroze Khan Noon were quite complacent about the rural massacre. Ghazanfer Ali instead suggested (a) a general election and since he expected winning all the Muslim seats therefore (b) the formation of a purely Muslim League Government.³⁸ Jenkins was certainly not amused to learn that League leaders instead of worrying about somehow harnessing the Frankenstein monster of communalism and anarchy, were more interested in forming a ministry. Mumtaz Daultana while touring Attock 'told the people in at least one village that if they could stick it out for a fortnight or three weeks, all the proceedings against them would be withdrawn, and the officials who have suppressed the disturbances would be given a hot time.'³⁹ Even M.A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan were quite bitter and complained to Mountbatten that he was in fact instructing Jenkins to 'reject Mamdot's request to be allowed to form a predominantly Muslim League Ministry.'⁴⁰ They maintained that Mountbatten was yielding to the threat of force by the Sikhs. Jinnah's assertion reflected the urgency on the part of the All India Muslim League to put together a ministry in the Punjab that unequivocally followed the central leadership's agenda.

Such circumstances were hardly conducive for the League to form a government as it could precipitate non-Muslim rebellion of extreme violence in Central and Eastern Punjab. Mamdot nevertheless was 'demanding immediate appointment of (a) Ministry with support of 90 members of Assembly including Muslim League 80, other Muslims 3, Scheduled Castes 4, Indian Christians 2 and European 1.'⁴¹ He did not provide any names of his Muslim League supporters nor of those outside the party who would lend him support in the Assembly on 'all questions of confidence.'⁴² A ministry so formed was likely to be dominated by one community and this seemed extremely perilous to Jenkins in the given circumstances. He was not in favour of installing solely a Muslim League Ministry, as it would be a 'fraud on constitution and instrument of instruction.'⁴³ Jenkins stressed to Mamdot more than once 'to renew his efforts to negotiate with other communities'⁴⁴ but this advice was ignored. Meanwhile, Jenkins after obtaining the Viceroy's concurrence on 5th March had 'made the proclamation under section 93 having first prorogued (the) Assembly.'⁴⁵ He also knew full well that in case Mamdot succeeded in forming Ministry, it would lead to dire consequences. 'There would then be immediate Sikh rising with Hindu support. Police, troops and myself (Jenkins) would immediately be involved on Muslim side in what would in fact be civil war for possession of Punjab.'⁴⁶ Already communal frenzy was at its worst in many districts foreboding ominous prospects for the Punjab. In these circumstances there was 'no alternative to a Section 93 administration.'⁴⁷

Mamdot's resignation from the Security Committee that Jenkins constituted to help oversee the law and order in the Punjab also reflected the League's indifference to the state of anarchy that the province had plunged into. Mamdot tendered his resignation as a protest to the search carried out by the law enforcement agencies in the vicinity of *Misri Shah* in Lahore. Such defiance hardly helped to stem the rising tide of violence.⁴⁸

British Administrative Responses

The difficulties for the Punjab administration mounted because of the communal polarisation and this badly affected its functioning. According to correspondence 'several irrigation engineers in Mianwali District including one British officer practically packed up at the first sign of danger. General attempts 'to get Muslim officials substituted for non-Muslims and vice versa'⁴⁹ became the order of the day. Not only the civil service but also the Army was subjected to communal polarisation. Jenkins had to exhort the politicians that 'we do not run the police or the Army on communal lines, and it is most dangerous to suggest a communal distribution of our resources.'⁵⁰

Demand for Partition, B.S. Rau Scheme and the Notional Divide

After the Rawalpindi massacre, Hindus and Sikhs were irreconcilable. They were intent on a partition of the Punjab. The resolution of the Congress Working Committee on 8th March was a confirmation of their resolve to see Punjab divided into Muslim and non-Muslim provinces. It was stated in the resolution:

....These tragic events have demonstrated that there can be no settlement of the problem of the Punjab by violence and coercion and no arrangement based on coercion can last. Therefore it is necessary to find a way out which involves the least amount of compulsion. This would necessitate the division of the Punjab into two provinces, so that the predominantly Muslim parts may be separated from the predominantly non-Muslim parts.⁵¹

The demand of non-Muslims became more and more vociferous with every passing day. Communal cleansing in Multan and Rawalpindi Divisions and the nonchalant attitude of the League leadership over the huge loss of human life and property accentuated the fissures among the three communities. Non-Muslim notables in a letter to Nehru stated, 'recent happenings in North Western Panjab have very rudely shaken the confidence of the Hindu and the Sikh minorities in the belief that there will be any fair deal for them at the hands of the Muslims in the future.'⁵² Baldev Singh also reiterated the same demand for 'a division of the Punjab and the creation of a new province embracing the contiguous area where non-Muslims form a clear majority as whole and have larger property interests.'⁵³

On 16th April the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) adopted the resolution in which on behalf of the Nationalist Hindus and the

Sikhs of the Punjab it put forward a demand for Punjab's partition into two provinces. It further said, 'for the redistribution of the provincial boundaries a boundary commission should be set up.'⁵⁴ While demarcating the provincial boundaries SAD asked that the following criteria be observed:

- (i) Population
- (ii) Landed Property
- (iii) Land Revenue
- (iv) Historical places and traditions of the various communities.

The Shiromani Akali Dal also called for proper arrangements for the exchange of population and property. Furthermore special arrangements for the protection, honour, integrity and sanctity of the historically religious places were solicited. It appealed to 'all the Panthic Organizations and workers to unite and solidly stand behind this demand.'⁵⁵

In such a situation when non-Muslims were pushing for the partition of the Punjab, to the chagrin of Jenkins, Jinnah demanded whole of the province to be included in the prospective Pakistan. However Mountbatten termed Jinnah's demand merely as a counterblast to the article published in the *Hindustan Times* on the 9th March.⁵⁶ Nevertheless tension kept on mounting as no amicable solution was in sight. Nehru suggested to Mountbatten on 24th March, 'temporary partition (primarily in order to end Section 93) into three areas, the first predominantly Muslim, the second predominantly Hindu and the third a mixed area.'⁵⁷ Nehru also proposed separate ministers to be appointed for each area, all under one Governor. He also emphasised that such a dispensation would strictly be temporary.

Sir B.N. Rau also propounded a scheme for regional ministries ostensibly to end Section 93 in the Punjab. The very idea of Notional Partition seemed to have emanated from that scheme.⁵⁸ Interestingly Nehru's suggestions reflected Rau's scheme. Both the schemes had striking similarities. B.N. Rau suggested that 'the Governor (acting under Section 59 of 1935 Act) should substitute a Regional for a Subject wise allocation of posts in the government.'⁵⁹ Hence the province, for administrative purposes, was to be divided into two regions, (i) Muslim and (ii) non-Muslim. In the form of the Viceroy's conference paper number seven, it was presented on 31st March and the Lahore Division was mentioned as 'Joint territory'.

Subjects like Education, Agriculture, Local Self-Government would be called 'Regional Subjects' as two regions 'may have divergent interests and needs.' Subjects like Finance and Irrigation, 'as to which their interests and needs cannot be divided may be called Joint Subjects.'⁶⁰ The Governor would have two sets of Ministers, Muslims and non-Muslims respectively to advise him on the Regional Subjects whereas both sets of Ministers would advise him on the Joint subjects. The portfolios of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister for the province were deemed very important. Interestingly if the Prime Minister were one of the Ministers from one region, the Deputy Prime Minister had to be from another region. However the province would have a single legislature but 'when legislation relating exclusively to Regional Subjects is

under consideration, the members representing constituencies of the other region should abstain from voting.⁶¹ Sir B. N. Rau prescribed a similar procedure to be adopted in connection with the Central Government. Further reference to Rau's suggestion regarding the Central Government is however beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that Rau thought that his plan not useful enough if implemented only in the Punjab. In that eventuality the Muslim League would ask for fresh elections that would result in their obtaining a small majority. However it would eventually lead to much bloodshed. The League's objection would not hold only if, in his view, 'the plan were also put into operation at the centre.'⁶²

Rau's scheme drew considerable attention at the highest level. However Jenkins was unimpressed. In a letter to G.E.B. Abell, he denounced the plan as unworkable after scrutinizing it from three aspects, its political acceptability, its administrative working and the timing of its introduction. In his view it would not be acceptable to Muslims and Hindus as both of them were tied to a High Command. Muslims would not accept any partition of the Punjab 'beyond what would be involved in the surrender of the non-Punjabi speaking districts of the Ambala division.'⁶³ Sikhs could accept such a plan with substantial modifications but in that case it was likely to be rejected by the Muslims and 'officially accepted by the Punjab Congress on behalf of the Hindus with many vocal dissensions.'⁶⁴ Jenkins' critique seemed more tenable with respect to the aspect of its administrative working. He thought any plan calling for the division of the Punjab into Eastern and Western, absolutely impracticable 'because the Lahore Division will be the final *casus belli*, and must be kept wholly or in part out of the two main regions.'⁶⁵ Therefore the Lahore division would be kept in the Central Region while the Amritsar district was to be transferred to the Eastern Region. The Lahore Division or 'Central Region' would have to have its own Ministers and as much autonomy as the other Regions.⁶⁶ A few more hazards that would make the administration intolerably cumbersome were the division of the budget into four parts, division of the revenue and the confusion cropping up in a department like education.⁶⁷ Similarly Jenkins found the Premier's task under the plan virtually impossible because of the existing communal polarisation.

The only solution in Jenkins view rested with the Muslim League and Congress High Commands. If they allowed their Punjabi followers to negotiate on their own, then the way out of the imbroglio could be hoped for and settlement on the Union idea would become a possibility. The other option was partition that could provide a long-term solution but that could only be imposed by force.⁶⁸ Undivided Punjab had always been preferred by Jenkins as partition would result in conflicting territorial claims of the Muslims and Sikhs.⁶⁹ The Muslim League claimed most of the Punjab. It was ready only to reluctantly surrender Ambala, whereas Sikhs wanted Chenab as the Western Boundary.⁷⁰ The leadership of the Punjab League was told by the All India Muslim League Council in no uncertain terms to avoid any negotiations that could jeopardise the demand for Pakistan. As Talbot states 'Jinnah was not prepared to risk this in order to secure peace in the Punjab. Its problems could only be solved by a

political détente at the centre.⁷¹ The unfolding of subsequent events eventually convinced Jenkins about the inevitability of the Partition despite its gruesome implications. He wrote to the Viceroy on 15th June, arguing ‘unity means ruin of one kind, and partition ruin of another; if there is to be ruin anyway, partition seems the simpler and perhaps the less bloody form of it.’⁷²

The idea of holding a referendum to ascertain the will of all the parties regarding the partition of the Punjab was floated mainly by Mountbatten but was subsequently dropped. Jenkins in particular was unenthusiastic as it seemed to him ‘in any circumstances a doubtful expedient in the Punjab, where the voters are entirely in the hands or at the mercy of the party leaders.’ A referendum according to Jenkins, ‘could not be on simple issue of adherence to Pakistan or Hindustan as in NWFP, but would have to be based on partition to which no question can at present be framed that could be answered in an unqualified ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

In those trying circumstances, Mountbatten thought it prudent to secure the All India leadership’s consent on Partition which in fact was the *raison d’être* for the 3rd June Plan. In that plan the provincial Legislative assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab were to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other, rest of the Province. The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting separately were supposed to cast their votes ‘whether or not the province should be partitioned.’⁷³ If a simple majority of either side voted in favour of a partition, the province would be divided accordingly. For the purpose of the final partition of these provinces, Governor-General was authorised to set up a Boundary Commission. On 4th June, Mountbatten in a press conference brought forward the date of transfer of power to 15 August 1947, instead of June 1948. That step is the focus of great historiographical controversy. Some writers have called it an ‘ill-judged decision’ that had intensified communal hostilities. Needless to say however, violence was already endemic in parts of Punjab by this juncture. The Partition Plan could be seen as a response to this fact, rather than a precipitating factor. The Muslim League accepted the Partition Plan on 9th June by passing a resolution whereby full authority was vested in the President of the All India Muslim League ‘to accept the fundamental principles of the plan as a compromise, although it cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab or give its consent to such partition it has to consider H.M.G.’s plan for the transfer of power as a whole.’⁷⁴ The Congress Working Committee also accepted the plan on 15th June though it had reservations about the status of North Western Frontier Province. A day earlier the working committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Panthic Pratinidhi Board jointly gave their assent. They however emphasised that ‘in the absence of a provision of transfer of population and property, the very purpose of partition would be defeated.’⁷⁵

The Sikhs claimed that the division of the Punjab should be ‘on the basis of the division of the total area of the province into half and half, or, 49,544 out of 99,089 square miles.’⁷⁶ Baldev Singh considered the non-Muslim claim on the divisions of Lahore, Ambala and Jullundur as ‘incontrovertible.’⁷⁷ The total area of the three divisions was 45,945 square miles whereas the total population

1,73,52,044 in which the non-Muslim proportion was 99,56 and the population of the Sikhs 30,04,707. If Punjab was divided on that basis, around 80 percent of the Sikhs and also Nankana Sahib would form the part of that area. Total revenue incurred from that area was Rs.2,42,28,998 and non-Muslim's share was Rs.1,64,34,704, the Sikhs paid Rs. 83,65,969.⁷⁸ Thus, on the basis of population and revenue payments these three divisions constituted, to the reckoning of Sikh leaders, 'a pre-eminently non-Muslim area.'⁷⁹ Credit for the higher revenue was given to the Sikh Jats, described as the most desirable of the 'Colonist' and responsible for turning the wilderness of the Western Punjab's colony districts to blossom like a rose. As Baldev Singh stated 'it is as if the energy of the virgin soil of the Bar has passed into his veins and made him almost a part of the forces of nature which he has conquered.'⁸⁰ Therefore as compensation, out of two districts Montgomery and Lyallpur, one was demanded.

As enshrined in para No. 9 of the Plan, the wishes of the people would be ascertained before setting up any partition machinery. The notional boundary for the Punjab had already been set up on the basis of the 1941 census. Thereby West Punjab was to be constituted by the Muslim majority areas comprising Lahore division (excluding Amritsar district), and Rawalpindi and Multan divisions, the non Muslim areas of Ambala and Jullundur divisions, and Amritsar district would be the East Punjab. Therefore members of western and eastern sections of the Punjab Legislative assembly met on 23 June and at the joint session, held at Lahore, 91 members voted in favour of the new constituent assembly whereas 77 for the existing constituent assembly. The western Punjab section of the Punjab Assembly voted against partition of the province by 69 against 27 votes, whilst the eastern Punjab section, meeting separately decided in favour of partition of the Punjab by 50 against 22 votes. Hence as Tan Tai Yong states, 'by the decision of the Legislative Assembly, the die was thus cast for the partition of Punjab.'⁸¹

British Responses: The Machinery of Partition

Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947,⁸² vested special powers in the Governors of the provinces of Punjab and Bengal 'for dividing between the new Dominions and between the new provinces to be constituted under this Act, the powers, rights, property and duties and liabilities of the Governor General in Council or as the case may be.'⁸³ Thus the Punjab Partition Committee was constituted on 17th June. Besides the Governor it consisted of 4 members. Two of the members would be the nominees of the Muslim League, one of the Congress and one the Panthic Party.⁸⁴ Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Mr. Zahid Hussain were the League's nominees, whereas Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava was nominated by the Congress and Swaran Singh represented the Panthic Party.⁸⁵ The parties were given full liberty with regard to the choice of their nominee whether from within or outside the Punjab. It was agreed that the Governor would preside over the meetings of the partition committee. Issues were to be settled not by votes but by setting up 'an agreed machinery for the settlement of

disputes.⁸⁶ A Steering Committee was constituted comprising of Mr. Sachdev and Syed Yaqub Shah⁸⁷ who would form the nucleus of the Partition Committee Secretariat. Four Expert Committees were also formed 'on the principle that the proper advisors on official matters were the persons actually responsible for the administration of those matters.'⁸⁸ The four expert committees had the following membership

A. On Financial Assets and Liabilities

Mr. Ram Chandra, Financial Commissioner Revenue, and
Mr. Abdul Majid, Financial Secretary.

B. On Physical Assets (irrigation and electric systems, roads and bridges, etc.)

Mr. Kirpalani, Financial Commissioner Colonisation;
Mr. Burt, Secretary I.B. (Central);
Mr. Thornton, Secretary Electricity Branch;
Mr. Freak, Secretary B.&R. Branch;
Mr. Abdul Majid, Financial Secretary.

C. On Services and Records

Mr. Akhter Hussain, Chief Secretary;
Mr. Chatterjee, Education Secretary;
Mr. Burt, Secretary I.B.(C);
Mr. Nawab Singh, Legal Remembrancer.

D. On use of Institutions of Provincial Importance

Mr. C.N. Chandra, Financial Commissioner, Development;
Mr. Chatterjee, Educational Secretary;
Mr. Burt, Secretary I.B. (C);
Mr. Nasir Ahmed, Director of Industries;
Col Aspinall, Inspector-General of Civil Hospitals.⁸⁹

The Partition Committee started working regularly from 1st July. However, Jenkins was dissatisfied with its progress. During the first fortnight, the Committee had managed to take decisions on the distribution of the I.C.S. personnel between the two provinces. However, some disputes cropped up in due course and the Partition Council at the Centre was asked to intercede. The matters specifically in dispute were:-

a) Whether the East Punjab Government should plan to move to Simla and actually do so if the notional boundary was confirmed on 15th August; (b) whether staff for disputed districts should be selected and posted on some joint basis, on the assumption that the notional boundary was confirmed on 15th August.⁹⁰ The Partition Council agreed as to the first issue and left the second

one for the Viceroy to decide. In order to settle those disputes Mountbatten visited Lahore on Sunday 20th July and met with the Punjab Partition Committee. Two important decisions emerged from that meeting which merit mention here. In the case of the Radcliffe Boundary Commission placing Lahore in West Punjab, 'the remnants of the East Punjab Government should leave Lahore by midnight 14/15th August' and vice versa. The posting of the officers would also continue on the basis of the notional partition except in the case of the Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police in the districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Lahore.⁹¹

The Punjab Partition Committee had a huge task ahead of it, of the division of the administrative machinery within a short span of time. Despite enormous difficulties Jenkins pushed the process forward and quite vexed issues were settled through prompt decisions. In the case of stalemate Mountbatten himself took the responsibility of its expeditious resolution. The systematic handling of every problem first by the Expert Committee then by the Steering Committee and finally by the partition committee made that cumbersome process not only possible but smooth and transparent. Only three problems were referred to the partition Council at the centre (a) Lahore as the centre of both the Governments (Eastern and Western Punjab), (b) the posting of the officers in three disputed districts, (C) the decision of the Punjab University. However some cases in which differences were substantial were referred to the Arbitral Tribunal by 31st December 1947 and the final decision was reached within three months.⁹²

In a meeting of the Partition Council held on 17th July 'Punjab Boundary Force' was formed to check the border clashes in the Punjab after its partition. The details given were as follows:

- a) It was supposed to deal with disturbances in the neighbourhood of the two dominions on or after 15th August.
- b) Major General T. W. 'Pete' Rees, was appointed Joint Commander of the Punjab Boundary Forces operating in the designated areas in the Punjab. The chain of control from the two Dominion Governments was through the Joint Defence Council⁹³ and Supreme Commander, General Auchinleck.
- c) The troops were to take position by 7th or 8th August at the latest.
- d) The law governing the use of the troops in aid of the civil authority would remain enforced even after 15th August.

After detailed and protracted discussions between Evan Jenkins, Commander in Chief and the Punjab Partition Committee, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhpura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jullundur and Ferozepur were declared as disturbed areas. Hence the total area assigned to the Punjab Boundary Force (hereafter PBF) was about 37,500 square miles that included 26 towns and approximately 17,000 villages.⁹⁴ The PBF consisted of two brigades of the 4th Indian Division, 11 Brigade covered Jullundur, Hoshiarpur and Ludhiana districts whereas the districts of Amritsar and Gurdaspur were assigned to 5 brigade. Similarly 14 Paratroop was to manage Lahore, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Lyallpur and Sheikhpura districts, 43 Lorried

Infantry was responsible for Ferozepur and Montgomery district and 114 Infantry was specified for the Lahore city only. The total strength of the PBF was seventeen battalions of infantry, a cavalry regiment and engineer, signal and medical units. It was 23,000 strong.⁹⁵

For two divisions of the PBF, it proved to be a daunting task to control such a huge area especially when communal bitterness was at its peak. The situation in certain towns showed some improvement however the rural parts within the area of PBF were by no means peaceful. Rather the disturbances spread to the places outside PBF's jurisdiction. According to one report 'for example, 70 percent of the major attacks on the railway trains have occurred outside the Punjab Boundary Force area.'⁹⁶ Therefore in a special meeting of the Joint Defence Council held in Lahore on 29th August 1947 it was unanimously decided that 'as the task allotted to the Punjab Boundary Force for helping to maintain law and order in the disputed areas has now grown out of all proportion to the responsibilities placed upon it, this Force should be abolished with effect from mid night 31st August/1st September....'⁹⁷ Hence the force was indeed abolished.

Punjab Boundary Commission and the Award

The Punjab Boundary Commission was constituted by the announcement of the Governor-General on 30th June 1947 (Reference No. D50/7/47R) under Section 9 of the 3 June Plan. The members of the Commission were four judges of the Indian High Court. Mr. Justice Din Muhammad and Mr. Justice Mohammad Munir represented Muslims, Mr. Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan and Mr. Justice Teja Singh represented Hindus and Sikhs respectively.⁹⁸ Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed as its Chairman. At the time he was Vice Chairman of the General Council of the English Bar. The Secretary of State recommended his name as a man of 'great legal abilities, right personality and wide administrative experience.'⁹⁹

Radcliffe arrived in India on 8th July and had only five weeks to make the most tenuous decision of his life. Another fact compounding the difficulty was his ignorance of India or Indian politics and he 'had absolutely no local knowledge of the territories he was to divide.'¹⁰⁰ Given his little knowledge of local conditions and inexperience in this sort of arbitration this helped in creating an impression of Radcliffe's impartiality which was painstakingly projected by the Viceroy himself. Such impartiality was an important consideration for the venture that Radcliffe was meant to undertake. In a situation where members of the Commission represented the communal interests of the parties they owed their allegiance to, Radcliffe was left 'with a considerable role to play in the deliberation process.'¹⁰¹ In the event of disagreement between the representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League, the Chairman had the discretion of a casting vote that made his role extremely critical. The terms of reference of the Commission as set out in the announcement of 30th June aimed at demarcating 'the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of

Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account other factors.¹⁰² The date stipulated for the Commission to arrive at a decision was 15th August.

The Public sittings of the Punjab Boundary Commission were held in Lahore from 21st July to 31st July. The Indian National Congress, the Muslim League and the Akali Dal were the main parties who made representations before the Commission through their counsels, M.L.Seetalvad, Sir Chaudhry Zafarullah and Harnam Singh respectively. A number of other interest groups and parties also argued their respective cases before the Commission. As Radcliffe was also Chairman of the Bengal Boundary Commission, whose proceedings were taking place simultaneously with the proceedings of the Punjab Boundary Commission, he therefore could not attend the Public sittings himself. However he made arrangements to keep himself abreast of the proceedings on a daily basis.

When members of the Commission entered upon discussions with the aim of reaching an agreed decision on the demarcation of the boundaries, the divergence of opinion among them was just baffling for Radcliffe. Particularly 'when it came to the extensive but disputed areas in which the boundary must be drawn, differences of opinion as to the significance of the term 'other factors', which we were directed by our terms of reference to take into account, and as to weight and the value to be attached to those factors, made it impossible to arrive at any agreed line.'¹⁰³ In such circumstances when agreed solution seemed remote, the onus fell entirely on Radcliffe's shoulders to make a final decision.

According to the final award West Punjab got an area of nearly 63,000 square miles, and 16 million population. It also had 4 million non-Muslims. East Punjab got an area of around 37,000 square miles and a population of 12.5 million of which 4.4 million were Muslims. West Punjab had 25 percent of the non-Muslim population whereas Muslims constituted slightly more than 35 percent of East Punjab's population.¹⁰⁴

Delimiting a boundary in Punjab was an extremely tedious task. However, 'the truly debatable ground in the end proved to lie in and around the area between the Beas and Sutlej rivers on the one hand and the river Ravi on the other.'¹⁰⁵ Drawing a boundary line in that area proved even more tenuous because of the canal systems, 'so vital to the life of the Punjab but developed only under the conception of a single administration.'¹⁰⁶ Same could be said about the systems of road and rail communication which had been planned on similar lines. Radcliffe was also cognizant of 'the stubborn geographical fact of the respective situations of Lahore and Amritsar'¹⁰⁷ and the claims to each or both the cities that Muslims and the non-Muslims had forcefully maintained.

The areas east of Sutlej and particularly in the angle of the Beas and Sutlej Rivers with Muslim majorities proved to be an acid test for Radcliffe as an arbiter. Radcliffe thought it rather detrimental to the interests of both the states if a strip on the far side of the Sutlej was included in the Western Punjab. According to Tan Tai Yong the disputed and debatable areas comprised the districts of Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur and Jullundur in the central Punjab.¹⁰⁸ He saw disruption of the railway communications and water

systems if the Muslim majority areas on the cis Sutlej side were awarded to West Punjab. Concurrently the intake of certain canals like Dipalpur canal, dependent on Ferozepore head works but served areas in the West Punjab made the task of demarcation of boundary all the more tedious. Some arrangement for joint control of such canals, to Radcliffe was the only workable proposition.¹⁰⁹

He did not find it possible 'to preserve undivided the irrigation system of the Upper Bari Doab Canal', sprouting from Madhopur and spread across to the neighbourhood of Lahore. Even to mitigate the consequences of this severance, he resorted to make minor adjustments to the Lahore-Amritsar district boundary. Similarly Mandi Hydro-electric Scheme supplying power to the Kangra, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepore, Sheikhpura and Lyallpur could not be preserved under one territorial jurisdiction. Given that drawing of the boundary line could not avoid disruption to unitary services like canal irrigation, railways and electric power transmission, Radcliffe saw agreement between the two States for some joint control of those valuable assets as the only viable solution.¹¹⁰

In such cases the 'other factor' was brought in as the more important mean rather than the principal of majority contiguous areas, to ascertain the future of the territories and assets, particularly those lying on the east of Sutlej. The term 'other factors' had not been clearly defined therefore it gave rise to myriad controversies and conflicting interpretations. Radcliff gave precedence to 'other factors' over the communal criterion particularly in the cases of Lahore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur.

The Lahore district with all of its tehsils had a Muslim majority. However the award boundary diagonally sliced away the south east of Kasur tehsil and gave it over to East Punjab. The 'other factors' and mainly the consideration of minimising disruptions to railways, canal system and communication network being the *raison d'être* for this decision. Amritsar District had 53.5 per cent of non-Muslim population with its northern tehsil of Ajnala having a clear Muslim majority. Nevertheless the whole of Amritsar district was allotted to East Punjab.¹¹¹ Yet another example of inconsistency on the part of the Boundary Commission was the Gurdaspur district which too was subjected to the criterion of the 'other factors' while determining its future. In that district Muslims formed a majority by a very narrow margin as their population was 50.2 percent. Its four tehsils Gurdaspur, Shakargarh, Pathankot and Batala had Muslim majority population but regardless of that fact all of them but Shakargarh were given over to India. Shakargarh though became a part of the Sialkot district in the West Punjab but a sizable part of it was sliced away from it and given over to East Punjab.¹¹²

The award of almost the whole of Gurdaspur district to the East Punjab generated a controversy that had far reaching implications. In Pakistan it has been believed with conviction that Gurdaspur was allotted to India in order to provide it with an access to Jammu and Kashmir. Mountbatten is usually incriminated to have exerted pressure on Radcliffe because the former was not pleased with Jinnah who refused to entertain his wish of becoming Pakistan's first Governor General. However the impact of the Gurdaspur award on the

Kashmir issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that Radcliffe deployed multiple factors in determining the boundary line: communal, irrigation, communication and most significantly 'other factors.'¹¹³ That inconsistency evoked sharp criticism among many people and press. It was 'self contradictory, anomalous and arbitrary' according to The *Hindustan Standard* of Delhi and 'territorial murder, a biased decision' and an 'act of shameful partiality' according to the *Dawn*.¹¹⁴ Radcliffe himself was cognizant of the impending criticism that the award would likely to evoke. While concluding his report he stated:

I am conscious too that the award cannot go far towards satisfying sentiments and aspirations deeply held on either side but directly in conflict as to their bearing on the placing of the boundary.¹¹⁵

Only political arrangements and not the boundary line drawn under the terms of reference of the Commission, Radcliffe thought, could have 'gratified to the full the sentiments and aspirations' of the communities with which he was not at all concerned.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless Radcliffe is a much-maligned figure particularly by the three communities as every one of them felt slighted and cheated.

Conclusion

Punjab experienced unprecedented turbulence and communal chasm in the months preceding its partition. Ever since the fall of the Khizr Ministry and promulgation of section 93 Punjab became simply ungovernable. Massive killing because of religious difference was a routine phenomenon. Even Jenkins, an administrator of commendable repute and with the vast knowledge about the province, was at a loss to come to grips with the ever deteriorating situation. He thought a coalition ministry representing all three communities could present a workable proposition. However cobbling together of such a Ministry remained his unfulfilled desire. He resisted Mamdot's bid to form a single party Ministry and in those circumstances he was fully justified as it could trigger a civil war in Punjab as communal sentiments were running very high. The Central Command of the League and the Congress, according to Jenkins, were mainly responsible for impeding political rapproachment at the provincial level. Here too Jenkins was spot on. Provincial interests were sacrificed for the gain at All India level. Onus of the worsening situation in the Punjab can be placed not only on the Central leadership of the League and Congress but also on the Viceroy who prioritised settlement of the issues at the central rather than at the provincial level.

The Congress leadership accused the British Government for the law and order situation obtaining during the last six months of British rule. Nehru in particular alleged British district administrators proved ineffective in coping with the grave and grievous state of affairs. He pointed out that all the districts facing violence had British Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police. However that argument can be turned around and as Talbot opines the administration of all such districts plagued with violence had been entrusted to

the British officers, who performed their duties under trying circumstances whereby even their lives were under threat.

Mountbatten and Radcliffe both incur a sharp criticism in Pakistan because of their supposed role in the award in which injustice was perpetrated to Pakistan. Assigning the task of partitioning of Punjab and Bengal to someone like Radcliffe could not assuage expectations of the competing claims of Muslims and non-Muslims. One must not lose sight of the fact that dividing Punjab was undoubtedly the most daunting task assigned to the Punjab Boundary Commission. The Punjab under the British was not conducive to partition however the communal polarisation made it imperative to draw a dividing line. However the decision of the Boundary Commission regarding award of Gurdaspur and Ferozepur districts to East Punjab in consideration to the 'Other factors' can be termed highly inexpedient to say the least.

Notes

¹ Kirpal Singh, (ed.) *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab 1947*, (New Delhi: National Book Shop, 1991), p.x.

² The Punjab became a major recruiting area because of the crucial loyalty of its population during the 1857 revolt. The growth of the 'martial races' ideology in the 1880s further cemented the linkage between certain areas of the Punjab and military service.

³ Ethnographic surveys, Census reports and District Gazetteers too quite significantly contributed to whip up the feelings of communal difference. In addition separate electorates were introduced for urban constituencies from 1883.

⁴ In order to repel the onslaught of the Christian missionaries a number of reform movements representing all major religions in the Punjab sprang up. The most significant in its impact was the *Arya Samaj*. They emulated the Christian missionaries by deploying the aggressive tactics for not only the defence of their respective communities but adding to their numerical strength.

⁵ For detail see, N.G.Barrier, *The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900* (Duke University, 1966).

⁶ Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988), p. 14.

⁷ Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of the Punjab* (Patiala, Publication Bureau Punjabi University, 1989), pp.10-11.

⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 11-12.

⁹ Kirpal Singh, (ed.) *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab 1947*.

¹⁰ Ian Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana: The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.151.

¹¹ For their influence and the political role in the Colonial Punjab see David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (University of California Press, 1988).

¹² Tan Tai Yong, 'Sir Cyril Goes to India': Partition, Boundary-Making and Disruptions in the Punjab in *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, 4, 1 (1997), p.4.

¹³ The Congress won 51 seats in the Punjab Assembly under the leadership of Bhim Sen Sachar. The Unionist Party could secure only 18 whereas the Panthic Pratinidhi Board had 22 seats. Coalition Ministry mustered a total support of 94 members. In Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana*, pp.197, 199.

¹⁴ Satya M Rai, *Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle in Punjab 1897-1947*, (New Delhi, 1984), p.318.

¹⁵ Ian Talbot has deployed the term of consociationalism while discussing Unionist Party's political philosophy with respect to Punjab which had heterogeneous communal demography. According to Arend Lijphart, the poly syllabic synonym for Consociational democracy is power-sharing. For detailed reference see Epilogue in *ibid*, pp.237-245.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p.204.

¹⁷ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p.227.

¹⁸ Sir Evan Meredith Jenkins was born on February 2, 1896. He joined Civil Service in 1920 and mostly served in the Punjab. Besides he was Chief Commissioner of Delhi in 1937 and then Secretary of the Department of Supply from 1940-43, Private Secretary to the Viceroy and Secretary to the Governor General (Personal) from 1943-46. He acted as Governor of the Punjab from 1946 to August 15, 1947.

¹⁹ Jenkins to Wavell, no. 652, 3rd March 1947, Mb1/D259.

²⁰ Jenkins to Wavell, no. 652, 3rd March 1947, MB1/D259.

²¹ *Ibid*.

²² *Ibid*.

²³ *Ibid*.

²⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁶ Baldev Singh to Lord Wavell, 11th March, 1947 MB1/D264.

²⁷ Jenkins to Wavell, no. 652, 3rd March 1947, MB1/D259.

²⁸ Baldev Singh to Lord Wavell, 11th March 1947 MB1/D264.

²⁹ Jenkins to Wavell, no.652, 3rd March, 1947, MB1/D259.

³⁰ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p.227.

³¹ On the morning of the 4th March, Hindu students clashed with the police outside Government College and later attacked a police station. That violence claimed five lives and led to another episode of rioting setting a precedence of arson attacks on Hindu businesses in the walled city. Shops in *Sua Bazar* and *Rang Mahal* were set ablaze. G.D. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning. A Survey of Events Leading Up To and Following the Partition of India* (New Delhi, 1989), p.101.

³² According to Muhammad Waseem 'Many ex-servicemen carried weapons with them which enhanced their power to inflict damage on the rival community because of their professional training in the use of arms and fresh experience on

the war front', 'Partition, Migration and Assimilation in Pakistani Punjab' in *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, vol. 4, No.1, January-June 1997.

³³ Donald Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley, 2001) in Ian Talbot, *The 1947 Violence in the Punjab* in Talbot (ed.) *The Deadly Embrace* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.4.

³⁴ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p.228.

³⁵ Ravinder Kaur, 'The Last Journey: Exploring Social Class in the 1947 Partition Migration' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, 3rd June 2006, p.2222.

³⁶ C.Dass Dutt, *The Punjab Riots and Their Lessons 30 April 1947*. S.P. Mukherjee Papers IV File 17, Nehru Memorial Museum Library in Talbot (ed.) *The Deadly Embrace* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.4.

³⁷ Jenkins to Viceroy, no . 666, 30 April 1947, MB1/D264.

³⁸ Governor to Viceroy, no. 64-G, Confidential 617-S, 20th March 1947.

³⁹ Jenkins to Viceroy, no. 666, 30 April 1947, MB1/D264.

⁴⁰ Mountbatten to Jenkins about Jinnah and Liaquat on 5th May MB1/D265.

⁴¹ Telegram (Grade C) From Governor to Viceroy, no. 28-G, 6th March 1947. Confidential 439-S (TOR-0630) MB1/D259.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of the Punjab*, p.120.

⁴⁹ Jenkins to Viceroy, no .662 31 March 1947, MD1/D264.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee on March 8th 1947, New Delhi, MB1/D267.

⁵² Letter to Nehru by Non-Muslim Punjabis, 2nd April, 1947, MB1/D264.

⁵³ Baldev Singh to Lord Wavell, 11th March, 1947, MB1/D264.

⁵⁴ Copy of the Resolution No. IX adopted by the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal, Amritsar in its meeting held on 16th April, 1947, MB1/D259.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Cypher Telegram (OTP) From Viceroy to Secretary of Punjab Repeated Governor of Punjab (Immediate) No.992-S. Dated the 5th May 1947 (TOD-2200) 'Certainly in recent conversations which Mieville and I have had with Jinnah he did not appear seriously to contest the need for partition but seemed even grateful for 17 districts of the Punjab.'

⁵⁷ Extract from the Viceroy's First Staff Meeting Held on 25th March 1947, MB1/D264.

⁵⁸ The scheme was discussed as Viceroy's Conference paper No. 7: Partition of the Punjab on 25th March.1947, MB1/D264.

⁵⁹ Sir B.N. Rau's Scheme for Regional Ministries, 25th March 1947, MB1/D259.

⁶⁰ Ibid. In the abstract of B.N. Rau's scheme given in MB1/D259, the 'Joint Territory', comprising the Lahore Division has not been mentioned as such. However in the text of Viceroy's Conference paper Number Seven the provision of the 'Joint territory' has been mentioned.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Jenkins to G.E.B. Abell, 31th March 1947, Secret. DO. NO.G.S.179.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ In a letter to Abell, Jenkins stated 'If the plan is ever presented, I would start with the regions defined as in Sir B.N. Rau's draft rule 1. I would if necessary transfer the Amritsar district to the eastern region, and keep only the remaining five districts of the Lahore Division in the Central region.

⁶⁷ Three ministers for each regional subject would expect to be served by separate departments; but they would find it in practice that in a subject like education regional autonomy can be applied only in a very limited sphere. The big policy questions in Education are (i) the improvement of University Education; (ii) the length of the primary stage and compulsion; and (iii) the pay of the teachers. These questions are closely linked with finance (necessarily a joint subject), and for obvious reasons no one Region could get out of step with the others in dealing with them. Education is only one example, and it would be found in practice that the policy aspects of almost all the regional subjects are in fact provided jointly.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ In his opinion, the partition was not workable because 'The Punjab as we know it is largely an artificial creation of Irrigation Engineers. During a period of anarchy our vast canal system would not be maintained and parts of it might be deliberately destroyed. Without it we could support perhaps two-thirds of our 1947 population, which must be roughly 30 million... It is unlikely that one community could conquer and hold the entire Punjab; and the result of a 'civil war' would in fact be a partition, the parties to which would have destroyed the administrative machine, the irrigation system, and other props of orderly Government.' The Punjab Problem, Jenkins to Viceroy, MB1/D259.

⁷⁰ Memorandum by the Punjab Sikh and Hindoo members of the Constituent Assembly, MB1/D260.

⁷¹ Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 231.

⁷² Governor to Viceroy, 15th June 1947, no. 683, MB1/D261.

⁷³ Partition Proceeding, Government of India, Vol. VI, p.2, in Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of the Punjab*, pp. 47.

⁷⁴ P.P., Vol. 1, pp. 6-7, in Ibid, p.48.

⁷⁵ Civil & Military Gazette, Lahore, June 15, 1947.

⁷⁶ Baldev Singh to Mountbatten, 27 April, 1947, MB1/D260.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Memorandum by the Punjab Sikhs and Hindoo members of the Constituent Assembly, Mb1/D260.

⁷⁹ Baldev Singh to Mountbatten, 27 April, 1947, MB1/D260.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Tan Tai Yong, 'Sir Cyril Goes to India' pp. 5, 19.

⁸² Indian Independence Act was passed on 18th July, 1947.

⁸³ Indian Independence Act, Section 9 (b), in Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of the Punjab*, p. 54.

⁸⁴ Mamdot, Sachar and Swaran Singh to Governor on Partition Committee, 17 June 1947, Lahore, MB1/D261.

⁸⁵ Minutes, Viceroy's meeting, Lahore, 22nd July, 1947, Mb1/D262.

⁸⁶ Mamdot, Sachar and Swaran Singh to Governor on Partition Committee, 17 June 1947, Lahore, MB1/D261.

⁸⁷ Mr. Sachdev was a senior ICS officer and Jenkins appointed him as the Partition Commissioner whereas Syed Yakub Shah was Additional Secretary Finance Department, Government of India, *ibid*.

⁸⁸ Note on a meeting on Partition preliminaries held at Government House, Lahore, at 10 a.m on Monday, the 16th June 1947, MB1/D261.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ A Dispute in Partition Committee, Jenkins to Viceroy, 13th July, 1947, no. 696, MB1/D267.

⁹¹ Issues Connected with the Partition Work in the Punjab, Note by the Viceroy, 20th July 1947, MB1/D267.

⁹² Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of the Punjab*, p. 69.

⁹³ A Joint Defence Council was established on 30th June under the then Commander-in-Chief. Governor-Generals of India and Pakistan, the Defence Ministers and other Parliamentarians of both the dominions were its members.

⁹⁴ Ludhiana District was included in the list of the disturbed areas on the 24th July 1947. For details see Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of the Punjab*, pp.125, 132.

⁹⁵ Robin Jeffrey, The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947, in *Modern Asian Studies*, 8, 4 (1974), pp. 491-520.

⁹⁶ Communiqué regarding Joint Defence Council's meeting held on 29th August 1947, Lahore, MB1/D268.

⁹⁷ Lord Mountbatten was the Chairman of the Council and the meeting was attended by the Governors General of India and Pakistan, The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, the Defence Ministers of the two dominions, the Governors of the two Punjabs, the Supreme Commander (Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck), the Commander in Chief Pakistan Army (General Sir Frank Messervy), Commander in Chief Indian Army (General Sir Rob Lockhart), and the Commander of the Punjab Boundary Force (Major-General Rees), see *Ibid*.

⁹⁸ *The Nawa-i-Waqt*, Lahore, 28 June 1947.

⁹⁹ Listowel to Mountbatten, 13 June 1947, in N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby (eds), *Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-1947* (London, 1981), Vol.11, 336.

¹⁰⁰ Tan Tai Yong, 'Sir Cyril Goes to India', p.7.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁰² Cyril Radcliffe, Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission, Para 3, Delhi, 12 August, 1947, MB1/D267.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, para, 6.

¹⁰⁴ Tan Tai Yong, 'Sir Cyril goes to India', p. 15.

¹⁰⁵ Cyril Radcliffe, Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission, para, 9.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Tan Tai Yong, *Sir Cyril Goes to India*, p.12.

¹⁰⁹ Cyril Radcliffe, Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission, para, 10.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para, 11.

¹¹¹ Tan Tai Yong, *Sir Cyril Goes to India*, p.13.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Cyril Radcliffe, Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission, para, 12.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*